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SUMMARY 
Theoretical models of the exchange rate are developed where 
information on the model is not fully available to agents. It is an 
application of Benjamin Friedman's (1979) theme that full rational 
expectations may be a possibility only in the long-run, even for 
completely rational individuals. The thesis attempts to develop the 
theory of exchange rate behaviour by considering some neglected 
informational issues. 
The three substantive chapters each consider specific aspects of 
relevance to the determination of the exchange rate from an asset market 
view of perfect capital mobility. These are the possible current 
account inter-relationship, the persistence of interest rate 
differentials between the two currencies and the subjectivity of and the 
regress in beliefs across a decentralised market. 
Generally, limited information on the model will give rise to 
erroneous beliefs, on the one hand, and encourage the acquistion of 
information and the revision of beliefs, on the other. Erroneous 
beliefs will cause correlations between variables, which may not 
normally occur inside full rational expectations. The revision of 
beliefs will bring a particular source of non-stationarity to the da~a. 
And the stability of certain learning forms may require limitations on 
the degree of capital mobility. 
These conclusions would suggest that any empirical work on 
modelling the exchange rate may gain from relaxing certain a priori 
restrictions, which properly belong to models with stronger assumptions 
on the availability of information. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
2 
1.1 Intention 
The aim of this thesis is to try to throw some light on the 
workings of the foreign exchange market. This market is an interesting 
subject for study in its own right, as an asset market on a global scale 
and as one which links the economies of different countries. However 
the main motivation for this thesis came as a reaction to the popular 
feeling that economic theory may not be adequate to the task of 
explaining the behaviour of the exchange rate. This feeling grew in the 
1980's when the data on floating exchange rates gradually accumulated 
only to say little in favour of the existing economic models. 
Meese and Rogoff (1983A and 1983B) found that a selection of 
monetary models could not improve on the predictions of random walk 
models for three dollar exchange rates. This result has been considered 
the more remarkable because of the use of the actual realisations of the 
explanatory variables as proxies for the corresponding expectations. 
The same result was used by Backus (1984) using portfolio-balance 
models. Haache and Townsend (1981) concluded that the existing stock of 
economic knowledge could not account for the behaviour of sterling over 
1971-1980. Despite some instances where structural models fared better 
than random walks - to be found in Meese and Rogoff (1985), Woo (1985), 
Schinasi and Swamy (1986) and Boughton (1987), economic theory has had 
little to say about the generation of the data. 
There are two broad interpretations to these results. One is 
that economic theory is inadequate to giving an explanation of exchange 
rate dvna!TIic~ 
./ 
h h d h' . ::inn .qeent~ m; e t ~ hptt:er ~~rve_ . y tl m~ c:erles method~ 
of prediction. The other is that the market is efficient, as many would 
infer from the random walk properties of exchange rates, and that market 
participants have information on variables which are not observable ex 
post to the econometrician. 
We suggest that the success of any model rests on the validity of 
its informational assumptions. Modifications in these might allow a 
more realistic description of exchange rate behaviour. So, the 
intention is to discuss why economic models in general might fail, 
without abandoning a basic confidence in the purpose of economic theory. 
It is not intended to consider the particular specifications of the 
various models as they stand in relation to the data. The informational 
issues of a model may be more important than minor differences in the 
underlying theoretical and dynamic specfications. The terms of 
reference will be theoretical, therefore, and not empirical, as our 
presumption is the failure of the models rather than the econometric 
exercise of assessing their applicability. 
1.2 'Information' 
A consideration of information is important to any analysis of the 
foreign exchange market because of its central role in conditioning the 
expectations which are made in this asset market. So, information, as a 
key word in this thesis, requires some initial elaboration. Economic 
models depict a relationship between the ascribed determined variables 
and the state variables in terms of an assigned functional form and 
parameter values. It is usual, particularly when looking at the 
question of informational efficiency. for the concept of inform~tion co 
be made with reference to agents' uncer~ainty of ~hE 5tate variables and 
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not to the model itself. If economic agents know the model, in the 
sense of its functional form and of its parameter values, they can use 
this knowledge to form expectations of the determined variables -
conditional on their information on the state variables. 
This world describes one of rational or model-consistent 
expectations, whether agents hold perfect or imperfect information on 
the model's state variables. The notion of rational expectations is an 
equilibrium one, which has been regarded as a characteristic in its 
favour. Rational expectations in exploiting the knowledge of the model 
are endogenously determined and self-fulfilling, and also have the 
optimum property of minimum error variance. Any criticism of the 
application of rational expectations is necessarily one against the 
assumption of an informational equilibrium. It should also be noted 
that as each economic agent forms rational expectations within this 
paradigm, it is also a concept of an individual equilibrium regarding 
the use of information. 
The concept of information in this thesis has a different 
application, relating to agents' uncertainty of the model itself. It .1S 
assumed that agents may be outside the state of rational expectations 
because they do not have full information of the parameter values of the 
model. The antecedents of this approach to the concept of infor~ation 
are more macroeconomic and are to be found in the papers of Taylor 
(1975) and of Friedman (1979). These papers describe a world in which 
~ational expectations is only a possibility of long-run equilibriw~. 
Friedman (1979) distinguishes between the information exploitation 
assumption and the information availability assumption of ratiunal 
expectations. The latter is related specifically to tht" iJdl"dllleter 
; . 
..... 
expectations. The latter is related specifically to the parameter 
values of the model. 
1.3 The Asset Market View, Rational Expectations and Market 
Efficiency. 
As a perspective to the ensuing discussion, we consider the 
general perception of the nature of the foreign exchange market. The 
standard theoretical models, either of the monetary or of the portfolio-
balance type, conform to the asset market view. That is to say that the 
magnitude of transactions in the capital markets dominates the exchange 
rate and dwarfs any effect the current account might have. The 
equilibrium, an asset market one, is believed to be reached 
instantaneously without the sluggish adjustment which is generally 
posited of goods markets. The condition of perfect capital mobility 
requires zero transactions costs and no impediments to the international 
flow of capital. It brings interest rate parity (covered for risk-
aversion, uncovered for risk-neutrality), whereby the expected returns 
on assets denominated in terms of different currencies are equalised in 
terms of anyone. Frankel (1983) gives a survey of the various 
categories of these models. The asset market view is genp.rally 
connected with the notion of an efficient market, but the link also 
requires the assumption of rational expectations. 
Rationality in the formation of expectations, which may be staled 
as the condition thac agents know how to exploit the information they 
hold with regard to the model. It also means that agents are endowed 
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forecast as if they knew the structure and the parameter values of the 
underlying model. Muth (1961) specified that 
, .. expectations .. since they are informed predictions of future 
events, are essentially the same as the predictions of the 
relevant economic theory'. 
Fundamentalist exchange rate models are usually cast in this mould with 
strong assumptions concerning the availability of information. 
Fama (1970) defined that: 
'A market in which prices always "fully reflect" available 
information is called efficient.' 
One condition would be that price would move quickly to reflect newly 
available information. Fast moving prices are consistent with the asset 
market view. Another condition for market efficiency is that 
, .. all agree on the implications of current information for the 
security price and distributions of future prices .. ' 
This condition is an alternative statement of a rational expectations 
equilibrium. The assumptions of an asset market with rational 
expectations lead into one of an efficient market. 
1.4 Random Walks and Rational Expectations. 
It is often believed that the presence of a random walk process 
for price indicates the existence of an efficient market. Evidence on 
the time series properties of the exchange rate is generally suggestive 
of random walks. This was found by Meese and Rogoff (1983A and 1983B) 
amongst others. Consequently, it is deduced that the exch.~!1~!'! rat:p. ,::q'"' 
be regarded as an asset m~rket price under the condition of rational 
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expectations. However, as there is no necessary connexion between a 
random walk and market efficiency, we may argue that it is not possible 
to extrapolate from the presence of random walks to rational 
expectations. 
Fama (1970 and 1976) considered that in an efficient market actual 
returns would vary only randomly from the informational equilibrium 
levels of prices and returns. In his 1970 survey paper, he credited 
Samuelson (1965) and Mandelbrot (1966) with the proposition that the 
popular random walk model was but a special case of the expected return 
or fair game model. A market could be efficient without a random walk. 
Market efficiency cannot be properly tested without recourse to a model 
determining equilibrium prices. Levich (1979) considered this with 
reference to the foreign exchange market. We would also suggest that it 
is possible to hypothesise a model outside rational expectations 
equilibrium where prices approximate a random walk. Indeed we would 
propose that the foreign exchange market is outside full rational. 
expectations on the evidence of the efficient market tests. 
1.5 Testing Market Efficiency. 
A test for efficiency which has been applied is to see if the 
forward exchange rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot, 
giving uncovered interest rate parity. This is properly regarded as a 
joint test of risk-neutrality and efficiency in expectations, as 
unbiasedness requires that there is no risk-premium separating the 
forward rate from the expected future spot exchange rate and no biased 
error between the expp.cted and actual futu'!'"e !';pnt. The tp'~t C·?r1 8r11y 
accept or reject a joint hypothesis of instantaneous equilibrium, of 
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rational (unbiased) expectations and of risk-neutrality. The first two 
parts of the hypothesis are sufficient conditions for an efficient 
market. Unfortunately, there are no generally accepted means, as yet, 
of separately testing each of part of this hypothesis. l 
Studies by Hansen and Hodrick (1980), by Baillie, Lippens and 
MacMahon (1983) and by Cumby and Obstfeld (1984) have rejected the 
hypothesis that forward rates are unbiased predictors of future spot 
exchange rates or of uncovered interest rate parity. On the acceptance 
of perfect capital mobility and, so, of instantaneous clearing, the 
tendency has been to make an exclusive choice favoring risk-aversion 
against biased expectations. This has coincided with the resurgence of 
the models of portfolio-balance in the early 1980's to try to explain 
data which had bewildered the monetary models of risk-neutrality. The 
record of portfolio-balance models has not shown any major improvement. 
It is here argued that the forward exchange rate has been a poor 
predictor partly and significantly so because of biased expectations. 
Risk premia cannot account for much of the discrepancy, because their 
magnitude should, on current estimates of risk parameters, not be 
significant. The risk-premium required by the individual for opening 
himself to risk would be miniscule and could be measured in terms of 
percentage points. Frankel (1982) claims that on the assumption of a 
coefficient of relative risk-aversion of 2, when the supply of foreig~ 
assets is substantially increased by one per cent of world wealth, the 
dollar risk-premium would rise by about 2 basis points. To give a 
1 Al~o, Krasker (1980) cited the 'Peso problem'. ~hCLe expecL~Llon~ 
of an event cause serially correlated bias in the short-run data, 
as an obstacle to testing market efficiency. 
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comparison, forward discounts may be measured in terms of percentages or 
in hundreds of basis points. 
The market risk premium should be even less because of two-
country dealing. Interpreting the risk premium as the amount of return 
required for holding the riskier of the two currencies, it is not clear 
that there is a riskier currency. Taking the Deutschemark-yen exchange 
rate as an example, the Deutschemark is the riskier to the Japanese and 
the Yen is the riskier to the Germans, as each will measure the risk of 
revaluation in terms of their respective holdings of assets denominated 
in the other nation's currency. It is not clear which currency, in the 
sense of the market overall, is the riskier and which should earn the 
premium. Any market premium is likely to be smaller than the absolute 
size of an individual premium because of positive and negative netting-
out. 
And the weight of third country dealing in the currency from 
international investors and institutions will weaken the market risk-
premium further. The a priori assertion cannot be made that Americans 
will find Deutschemarks more or less risky than yen. We suggest that 
the presence of market risk-premia is not sufficient to explain the 
failure of uncovered interest rate parity. 
Direct evidence of biased expectations has been found from survey 
data obtained by canvassing the beliefs of market participants. Frankel 
and Froot (1987) found that although the actual spot rate is ~10se to a 
random walk, expectations were excessively speculative and prediction 
errors ~yere significantl y ~(')rre L:it~0 '.vi th expectati one.: M3.cDcnald c.r:d. 
Torrance (1988) found the same using more recent data. These results 
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suggest that the foreign exchange market cannot be regarded as 
efficient, despite the random walk evidence of exchange rates. 
Moreover, they also suggest that the failure of the models may be 
due in large part to their auxiliary informational assumptions. It may 
be inappropriate to model with strong-form rational expectations for the 
same reason that the efficiency tests fail. Models either of stochastic 
perfect foresight or of static expectations may not take us very much 
further regarding the treatment of information than models of certainty-
equivalence. 
The state of full or strong-form rational expectations is 
constituted where the parameter values of the model are known by the 
agents. We may consider relaxing this hypothesis, which Friedman (1979) 
designated the availability assumption of rational expectations 
equilibrium. We would suggest that the evidence of exchange rate 
floating is inconsistent with the presence of full rational 
expectations. 
1.6 An Alternative Expectations Hypothesis. 
It seems that there may be some gain in modelling exchange rates 
without the assumption of strong-form rational expectations. Adaptive 
expectations are backward looking and so unsuited to a model where 
forward looking behaviour is so important. They are generally 
inconsistent and unable to keep track of a non-stationary time series. 
We propose that expectations in the foreign exchange market ought to b~ 
forward-looking, but need not necessarily be founded on a full 
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information of the model's parameter values. So, at leas~ in the shor:-
run, agents may make systematic forecasting errors as in Taylor (1975) 
and Friedman (1979). 
Full rational expectations with complete information of parameter 
values can be regarded as a long-run position, which rational agen~s 
would seek to obtain. The short-run can be considered as a period of 
learning. The literature on learning [reviewed by Bray, Blume and 
Easley (1982)] treats the question of the stability of learning as the 
one of relevance to the justification of the operational use of rational 
expectations. If the revision of beliefs on parameter values is a 
convergent process, then the resulting REE is judged as stable, 
justifying the use of strong-form rational expectations. 
Our perspective, however, is that learning processes, whether or 
not they lead stably to a long-run equilibrium, contribute a plausible 
source of dynamics to a model. This is because the data which we 
observe belongs to the short-run. The revision of bel~efs may generally 
account for dynamic patterns in the same way as cost-induced partial 
adjustment. It also represents a particular view of the world,also seen 
by Lachmann (1956): 
'The business man who forms an expectation is doing precisely what 
a scientist does when he formulates a working hypothesis. Both 
business expectation and scientific hypothesis serve the same 
purpose; both reflect an at~empc ac cognition and orientation in 
an imperfectly known world, both embody imperfect knowledge to be 
tested and improved by later experience.' 
1.7 The Description of this Thesis. 
This thesis aims to describe dynamic patterns in a theoretical 
model of the exchange rate which derive from a relaxation of the 
information availability assumption of REE. Throughout it is assumed 
implicitly that agents optimise as individuals, so that they fully 
exploit the information which is available. The treatment of 
information constitutes therefore an arguably small departure from the 
standard macroeconomic REE paradigm. But even a small crack in this 
edifice will give sight of some different results. 
The work is contained in three main chapters. Each chapter looks 
at a different aspect of an exchange rate model, and each chapter looks 
at a different informational issue. With regard to the exchange rate 
aspects of the underlying model, Chapters Two, Three and Four deal 
respectively with the effects of the current account in an asset market 
model of the exchange rate, the persistence of interest rate 
differentials and the multiple regress in expectations. The 
corresponding informational issues are the effect of mistaken beliefs on 
objective parameter values, the effect of the revision of beliefs and 
those which arise in a decentralised market where subjective beliefs 
affect outcomes. 
In Chapter Two the relationship between the current account and 
the real exchange rate is considered from an asset market view. It is 
generally held that the current account cannot affect the exchange rate 
independently of any effe~t through the demands and supplies of assets. 
Perfect asset substitutability is assumed, precluding t:hp. r()"!:"t-';:~li~­
balance effects which would occur with induced changes in ne:: country 
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liabilities within a preferred-habitat model, as in Dooley and Isard 
(1979). In our model, as in Kouri's (1976) paper, a total balance of 
payments view is taken of exchange rate determination. 
A parameterisation is used which helps to isolate the 
informational and expectational aspects. With full rational 
expectations, where agents know the model's parameter values, the 
capital account, moving infinitely fast, will compensate to neutralise 
any perceived current account movements. However, if pa.ra.meter value~ 
are not fully known, the capital account will act on misperceptions. We 
consider one parameter in particular, the persistence of autonomous 
current account shocks. If these are positive (negative) and the 
persistence is under- (over-) anticipated, the current account will 
directly cause an appreciation. If these are negative (positive) and 
over- (under) anticipated, depreciation occurs. Consequently, an asset 
market view is not inconsistent with data which will describe periods 
where there is a negative relationship between the current account 
balance and the exchange rate, as the flows theory predicts, and periods 
where there is a positive relationship, which no theory will predict. 
An econometric implication is that it is not possible to estimate a 
fixed parameter response of the exchange rate to the current account 
even outside the asset market view. 
A second theme to Chapter Two, centred on the current account, is 
the question of the multiplicity of equilibria within a dynamically 
structured rational expectations model. In the parameterisation chosen, 
there is, a priori, an infinite number of stationary solutions for the 
long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. We show that agents need not 
kno ..... the particular solution which ':Jill bring, lur~g-run current: ,·F ,:;OlLnt 
· .. I < 
... ...J 
balance (and so no further cross-country redis:ributions of wealth), bu~ 
that if they try to learn a particular equilibrium by observing the 
exchange rate, they will be able to learn this unique value. The reason 
why is that we have allowed the structure of the current account 
equation to enter the condition for the exchange rate by the 
specification that the structure of the total balance of payments is 
important. We also find instances of overshooting because of the 
sluggishness of beliefs. 
This brings us to Chapter Three which draws on the previous 
analysis to assess in greater depth whether exchange rate dynamics can 
be attributed to rational bubbles, representing non-stationary 
equilibria. This hypothesis is discounted and replaced with another in 
its stead. This is that the revisior. of beliefs outside full rational 
expectations can cause non-stationarity in the data. If agents beliefs 
are outside full rational expectations and inconsistent with market 
outcomes, there will be incentives to revise beliefs until consistency 
is reached. As an application, an example of agents' learning the 
degree of persistence of real interest rate differentials is considered 
In a model with sluggish real interest rates, either because nominal 
rates are exogenously determined or because (expected) inflation rates 
are sluggish, the more persistent the differential is expected to be, 
the greater will be the wedge between the current and long-run real 
exchange rates. The revision of beliefs can give the appearance of 
cycles in the data. Learning i~ adaptive and Bayesian, and an 
interpretation is given to the subjective priors, which themselves 
affect the data. 
The learning example in Chapter Three is consistent in the sense 
that it has no unanticipated effect on the model. Indeed, rather s~rong 
a~sumptions are implicit in the effect that agents act as one, so that 
this example is not too far removed from the standard macroeconomic 
rational expectations paradigm. In Chapter Four, we consider a more 
difficult problem where beliefs and expectations are heterogeneous. 
Here, the beliefs of others become state variables in the model. We 
take Keynes (1936) description of the multiple regress in expectations 
and apply it to an exchange rate example. There are certain 
difficulties in specifying consistent learning processes which can take 
account of the effect of other agents' learning on the model. 
Furthermore, the situation of an agent facing a model which is non-
stationary, because of the indecypherable effect of others' learning. is 
one of Knightian uncertainty. To such cases the apparatus of 
statistical inference cannot be applied. 
In this chapter two possibilities are considered. One is a form 
of soc~al learning where agents sample the beliefs of others in the 
belief that they are in rational expectations (~ or the grass in greener 
in the other field). The learning model is constructed in such a way as 
to ensure its consistency, although agents are generally outside 
rational expectations. This particular example is of interest because 
the learning model is analogous to a bubble which decays geometrically 
over time and also because average beliefs within it are indeterminate. 
This may describe what many would typify as a 'bubble' where there are 
beliefs on beliefs in the Keynesian asset market regress. 
Finally, a second form of learning is given where agencs learn the 
form which is correct inside rational expecLutions equilibrh~I", ;,uL 
, -
incorrect outside, and so inconsistent. It is not unlike the example 
given by Cyert and DeGroot (1974), which was followed un bv Brav and 
• J • 
Savin (1986). However, to simplify somewhat we consider adapti':e 
expectations of the relevant parameter. Adaptive expectations of a 
parameter may at times be a special case of Bayesian learning [Turnovsky 
(1969)]. They can be justified when the prior information endowments 
are limited as well as where there are uncertain returns to more 
statistically sophistocaced processes. The result replicates that of 
Bray and Savin (1986), that the parameterisation favourable to the 
stability of the underlying model is also favourable to the stability of 
its rational expectations form. There are some further results which 
come out in this chapter of relevance to exchange rate dynamics. 
In a setting of rational expectations equilibrium, most 
parameterisations of the capital account are feasible with perfect 
capital mobility, because a solution is imposed by construction. We 
refer again to the persistence of real interest rate differentials. In 
the model we have devised the only condition required inside rational 
expectations is that the degree of persistence must be imperfecc - leSS 
than unity. In the same model but where agents do not believe that they 
are inside rational exnectations, the existence of a finite equilibrium 
. 
requires the preclusion of perfect capital mobility. This is because an 
equi.librium with this hypothetical limit of capital mobility requires 
the condition that agents expect exact interest rate parity. There is 
no algorithm outside rational expectations to ensure that this condicion 
will necessarily be met. As we conclude that solutions will generally 
be without perfect capital mobility, there will, therefore, be direc: 
effects from the current account (and from foreign exchange 
intervention) on the exchange rate, if it is determined by the total 
balance of payments. 
A second conclusion which is specific to the inconsistent learning 
example is that the persistence of interest rate differentials must be 
very high where there is high capital mobility. This is because 
learning is conditioned on the signal of the interest rate differential. 
If it follows a random walk its change will be minimal from period to 
period, causing less movement in the data which will then dampen thp 
destabilising effect of the inconsistent learning process in favour of 
stability. 
The approach taken in this thesis is basically the standard 
macroeconomic one towards rational expectations, with a major proviso in 
that we relax the strongest forms of information availability 
assumptions. These pertain to the parameter values of the model. Our 
main intent is not to reconsider the theoretical specifications of the 
various fundamental models with regard to capi:al mobility, asset 
substitutability and price flexibility. It is to suggest that since it 
is information which conditions the expectations which drive the capitAl 
account of the balance of payments, the success of any fundamental model 
of exchange rate behaviour stands or falls on the quality of its 
auxiliary informational assumptions. 
~I 
1.5 
CHAPTER 2 
THE ASSET MARKET VIEW AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT: 
THE ROLE OF INFO~~TION 
2.1 Introduction 
Information is paramount to the decisions agents make in asset 
markets. The notion of the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) , 
following Muth (1961), is conventional for modelling the role of 
information. Friedman (1979) has shown that this notion consists of two 
separable assumptions concerning the availability and the exploitation 
of information. The usual axiom of individual optimality makes the 
latter less contentious, if information is seen as an endowment. This 
chapter concerns itself with a relaxation of the information 
availability assumption with respect to the inter-relationship between 
the current account and the exchange rate. 
An exchange rate model is considered where agents do not have full 
information of its parameter values. On the one hand, this will lead to 
misconceptions which affect the parameterisation of the model. 
Observable movements in the current account will affect the exchange 
rate outside the state of strong-form rational expectations. On the 
other hand, the revision of incorrect beliefs concerning parameter 
values will give rise to additional dynamics, which might otherwise be 
attributed to inherent instabilities. So we hope to add something to ~n 
understanding of the dynamic behaviour of the exchange rate. 
We briefly review the structure of this chapter. Section 2.2 
looks at the role of the current account in models from the asset market 
view (AMV) of perfect capital mobility. There the current account 
usually affects the exchange rate as a flow of outside wealth, affecting 
asset demands. 
19 
Section 2.3 constructs a model which omits wealth effects to 
isolate the phenomenon of interest. There is risk-neutrality and 
interest rate exogeneity. These prevent wealth flows from affecting the 
exchange rate by portfolio-balance or by money demand effects, 
respectively. The exchange rate is determined by the total balance of 
payments on the current account and the capital account. The AMV is 
represented by an infinite parameterisation of the capital account, 
which responds to expected yield differentials between domestic currency 
denominated (dcd) and foreign currency denominated (fcd) assets. 
The current account is dealt with in Section 2.4. A two-country 
macro-model determines the income levels on the basis of the IS curves 
alone, because of the interest rate exogeneity assumption. The current 
account is determined by the differentials between the two countries' 
variables, because of the simplification of the common coefficients 
assumption. There is also an independent shock parameter, which is 
autoregressive with a coefficient representing its degree of 
persistence. 
Section 2.5 describes the strong-form REE solution of the model. 
The problem of determining the long-run equilibrium, which generally 
affects dynamic REE models [see Shiller (1977)] is resolved by imposing 
the additional condition of long-run current account balance, where 
there are no net wealth flows across countries. The informational 
specification of the model along with the .-\."1\1 assumption in this sectioll 
leads to new-classical characteristics. Only unobservable and 
unanticipated current account movements affect the exchange rate. 
infinite parameterization of the capital account lS analogous to 
The 
infini te ly flexible prices in mode ls where moneY i.s deUl.l..J 1 ;.;[1 l:--.e ceal 
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economy [as in Lucas (1972), Sargent and Wallace (1975), and Barro 
(1976)]. 
The central role of information is drawn out in Section 2.6. Here 
agents are permitted to make expectations based on incorrect estimates 
of the model's parameter values. It is shown that misanticipations of 
the persistence of current account shocks will affect the exchange rate. 
This result depends on a non-simultaneity between the observed 
equilibrium and the elements of the information set conditioning it. 
The mechanism is through the otherwise neutralising effect of capital 
account responses. In the strong-form of Section 2.5 agents make 
appropriate and powerfully orchestrated responses in the asset markets. 
In this section they can miscalculate so that over (-under)-
anticipations of the persistence of current account shocks will trigger 
over (-under)-reaction on the capital account. 
Section 2.7 concludes by considering the revision of beliefs at an 
individual and an aggregate level. The learning is of the long-run 
equilibrium of the exchange rate on the basis of recent observations of 
the (short-run) exchange rate. Agents do not know the value consistent 
with long-run current account balance. Moreover, they need not know 
that long-run current account balance is a condition, in which case the~ 
see themselves learning one out of an infinity of possible solutions. 
It is shown, because of the balance of payments specification of the 
model, that the equilibrium from learning is the one consistent with 
long-run current account balance. 
The dynamics of the learning process can be sta~le or unstable, 
depending on the pace of revi~ion in beliefs and on the unrlerlying 
parameterization of the model as in Cyert and DeGroot (1974) and Bray 
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and Savin (1986). If the Marshall-Lerner elasticities condition does 
not hold the serial correlation of beliefs will ~e unambiguously 
positive. There will be negative serial correlation only if the exports 
and imports elasticities are very strong. The dynamics will never be 
unstable if there is positive serial correlation, but they should be 
stable with negative serial correlation with plausible elasticity 
values. In the stable case, a structural change followed by a process 
of learning will constitute overshooting. 
There also is a signal extraction problem. Unobservable current 
account shocks introduce noise into the learning process and contaminate 
the signal which agents observe. Consequently short-run current account 
shocks will also affect the exchange rate through their unwanted 
influence on agents' beliefs of long-run values. The extent of the 
noise is determined by the non-observability of the shocks plus their 
degree of persistence. 
2.2 The Asset Market View of the Exchange Rate and the Role of the 
Current Account 
Early models of the exchange rate [Bickerdicke (1920), Robinson 
(1937) and Machlup (1939, 1940)] took a flows approach to excha~ge rate 
determination. That is to say, that prominence was given to the current 
account with some qualification for capital flows, which were treated as 
exogenous transfer payments. Equilibrium was mainly a matter of current 
account balance. The stability of equilibrium depended on the Marshall-
Lerner elasticities conditions whf\re devrtluation would imprnvt? th~ 
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current account balance. This simple model at least had the virtue of 
focusing on the market for foreign exchange. 
The experience of highly mobile international capital of large 
magnitudes, since the breakdown of Bretton Woods, has led to a non-flows 
oriented approach in the asset market view (AMV). It has also led to 
models which focus less on the market for foreign exchange and more on 
the money and bond markets. 
The AMV is to see the exchange rate as being part of a set of 
conditions consistent with perpetual equilibrium in the financial ~sset 
markets. ' ... the asset market view relies critically on the assumption 
of perfect mobility and continuous instantaneous equilibrium in capital 
markets' [Dornbusch and Krugman (1976), p.554]. It is inappropriate to 
consider the effects of flows of international pa)~ents independently of 
the relevant stock demands and supplies which determine the exchange 
rate. 
Models from the AMV share the feature of perfect capital mobility, 
whether they are of the monetary or of the portfolio-balance type 
[Frankel (1983)]. The monetary approach models the (nominal) exchange 
rate from the condition of purchasing power parity (PPP) and the 
relative price levels from the conditions of money market equilibrium in 
each country.l Flexible price monetary models [Frenkel (1976) and 
Bilson (1978)] have been superseded by sticky-price models, following 
Dornbusch (1976), which present an explanation for overs~ooting. 
1 Purchasing power parity (PPF) is thc thcor) tl1C:i.~ ill l.erm.::; or one 
currency there is no change in internacional relative prices, as 
nominal exchange rates move proportionally with relatjve national 
price levels. 
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Portfolio-balance models have also emerged within the general AMV. 
Their distinctive claim is that assets of different currency 
denominations, identical in all other respects, are non-perfect 
substitutes because of the liability of risk from exchange rate 
revaluation with risk-averse agents. Risk-aversion will encourage 
portfolio diversification as agents trade off risk with expected return. 
Branson (1976), Kouri (1976), Dooley and Isard (1979) and Rodriguez 
(1980) provide examples of portfolio-balance models. 
Portfolio-balance theorists would include all the markets for 
assets which enter international portfolios in modelling the exchange 
rate, while monetarists would concentrate on the narrow range of assets 
which are believed to determine prices. An extensive and systematic 
review of both classes of AMV models is found in Frankel (1983). 
An increased preference for portfolio-balance models was 
encouraged by a perceived correlation between current account deficits 
and depreciation. Mussa (1983) designated this as one of the empirical 
regularities of the exchange rate. Kouri (1983) argued that the 
monetary models had effectively thrown the baby out with the bath water 
in denigrating the role of the current account. 
There is a channel, however, through which the current account can 
affect the exchange rate even within the strictures of the monetary 
model. A current account imbalance transfers wealth from the deficit to 
the surplus country, which should bring a respective fall and rise in 
their money demands, given the function postulated by Friedman (1956). 
8!lt Dornbu~ch (1980) has related evidence that the effect3 of w€a~:h arE 
not empirically significant. 
2~ 
It is also an empirical matter whether wealth effects would have 
greater weight in a portfolio-balance framework. A theoretical case for 
this possibility is made by the 'preferred local habitant' variant model 
[e.g. Dooley and Isard (1979)]. Agents are biased towards holding the 
asset which is denominated in the currency of the country of which they 
are resident. A domestic surplus would cause a relative demand switch 
from foreign to domestic assets, appreciating the exchange rate. 
Importance has been given to the current account in its role also 
as a source of information. In a REE context where all available 
information is fully exploited, it is unanticipated information or 
'news', captured in the form of innovations, which is significant. 
Dornbusch (1980), Hooper and Morton (1980), Dooley and Isard (1979) and 
Isard (1980, 1981) consider news transmitted by current account 
observations. 
A rationale is that long-run current account balance is considered 
to be the long-run equilibrium notion (as opposed to PPP). In that 
state, wealth flows across countries will net out to zero. As the real 
exchange rate is a determinant of the current account, agents can 
anticipate its terminal value which is consistent with overall balance, 
after projecting the terminal values of the other variables which also 
determine the current account. For example, an autonomous and 
autoregressive component in exports may be unanticipatedly high today. 
This is projected to continue, requiring an appreciated real exchange 
rate to bring long-run current account balance. So unanticipated 
. h t t- ,. d ce approc; ,3.,,; 0..-. ... +-h~"'''C"'h .... h'" improvements ~n t ~ curren accoun. may _n u ' ,- ..... '-~ -.,,~ -".-. ....... b'· '-, .... 
news effect. Isard (1980) draws the distinction between news which 
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relates to long-run factors, the long-run equilibrium of the exchange 
rate, and that which relates to short-run factors, exchange risk premia. 
Summarising the AMV, the channels of current account effect are 
limited to those which influence the stock variables, actual and 
expected, which determine the equilibrium. In this sense, they can be 
said to be indirect. Outside the paradigm of perfect capital mobility 
with full rational expectations, it is possible for the flow variables 
to affect directly the exchange rate through working on the demand and 
supply of foreign exchange. Niehans (1977) broke from the AMV in 
abandoning the assumption of perfect capital mobility to demonstrate a 
direct current account effect. 
Perfect capital mobility is maintained throughout this paper. 
Instead we want to concentrate on the more informational issues to show 
current account effects outside strong-form REE. A second intent is to 
combine a balance of payments perspective with an AMV. 
In the strong-form of the model it is only unanticipated movements 
in the current account which have an effect. In the weaker-form where 
agents have incorrect beliefs on parameter values, namely the 
persistence degree of current account shocks, misanticipations allow for 
effects in the same way that money is non-neutral outside full REE in 
Taylor (1975) and Friedman (1979). This highlights the importance of 
beliefs within the AMV and the requirement of correct beliefs to prevent 
current account effects. 
26 
2.3 An Asset Market View (AMV) of the Exchange Rate from a Balance of 
Payments Perspective 
The AMV is one of equilibrium in the asset markets relevant to the 
model. Monetary models consider the money market and portfolio-balance 
models look more widely at the markets for internationally traded 
financial assets. We propose a structural balance of payments approach 
which will bring to the fore the foreign exchange market through which 
international transactions of goods and assets ultimately go. Kouri 
(1983) combined an AMV with an explicit modelling of the balance of 
payments. 
Kouri's (1983) model differs from ours in two respects. One is 
that his balance of payments equation includes only the capital account, 
giving his AMV. Our approach is to combine the current account with the 
capital account, and our AMV is in the guise of an infinite 
parameterisation of the capital account component. So that although 
each account enters the race to determine the exchange rate, the current 
account moves sluggishly while the speed and magnitude of capital flows 
is potentially unbounded. 
The second difference is that in Kouri (1983) the current account 
is important through the consequent financing effect of any imbalance. 
Relative asset supplies are then affected and, so, the capital account. 
The current account is defined as the change in domestic holdings of 
foreign ~ssets in a simplified and special case of his model [see his 
equations (9) and (10)]. This effect is not considered here. 
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The demand for foreign exchange derives from the demand to buy 
foreign goods and services and from the demand to buy foreign financial 
assets. Similarly, the corresponding supply is the foreign demand for 
domestic exchange to buy domestic goods, services and financial assets. 
Domestic and foreign assets are in domestic currency denomination (dcd) 
and foreign currency denomination (fcd) respectively. 
The assumption of foreign exchange equilibrium amounts to the 
condition that the domestic demand for foreign currency equals the 
domestic supply from the corresponding foreign demand: 
M + ~Fd E(X + ~Df) 
M imports nominal revenue 
X exports nominal revenue 
~Fd the change in domestic holdings of fcd assets (in nominal 
terms) 
(1) 
6Df the change in foreign holdings of dcd assets (in nominal terms) 
the nominal exchange rate: the domestic price of foreign 
currency 
We overlook foreign exchange intervention by assuming a perfect float_ 
Alternatively, we could redefine M and X to include intervention flows. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the interest 
payments component of the current account. Interest payments on 
cxcernal debt deserve a special consideration because of the complicated 
dynamic relationships which result. The current account is regarded 
more or less as the trade account for the expositional purpose of this 
paper. 
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Equation (1) can be written in terms of the nominal exchange rate: 
E (M + ~Fd) / (X + ~Df) (2) 
A rise in imports revenue, M, or a rise in the import of foreign 
capital, ~Fd, depreciates the exchange rate (a rise in E) through the 
concomitant rise in the demand foe foreign exchange. A rise in exports 
revenues, X, or exports of domestic capital, ~Df, appreciates the 
exchange rate through increasing the supply of foreign exchange. 
It remains to model the two balance of payments accounts; the 
capital account is considered in this section from an AMV. We assume 
that there are vast stocks of perfectly mobile capital which can 
dominate the total balance of payments. We also assume risk-neutrality, 
which is not necessary to the AMV, but which serves as a modelling 
convenience. 
A definition for perfect capital mobility is as follows. In 
* general terms, let Kt be the desired amount of K at time t and Kt be the 
actual amount. With quadratic costs of adjustment and of 
disequilibrium, a cost-minimization exercise gives the partial 
adjustment model [see Stewart and Wallis (1981)] . 
.,. 
(1 - g) (Kt - Kt - 1 ) 
where g is the ratio of the weight on adjustment costs to the total of 
both weights. Perfect mobility or frictionless adjustment applies wheIe 
the weight on adjustment costs is zero. Here 
* * 
Applied to the model, after time subscripting, 
.,. .,. 
~Dft Dft - Dft _1 ( 1 ) 
, - , 
.,. .,. 
~Fdt Fd - Fdt _1 t 
The actual flows of capital are the first differences in the desired 
holdings of the asset stocks, given our perfect mobility assumption. 
Asset market equilibrium may be brought about by price or quantity 
adjustment or by a combination of the two. If there are three prices for 
the three assets, dcd, fcd and foreign exchange, there is a multiplicity 
of possible price combinations (even with stationary expectations) which 
are consistent with overall equilibrium. Therefore the price of foreign 
exchange as one of the prices will depend on the other prices, for dcd 
and for fed assets. It is necessary to predetermine these in order to 
arrive at a unique equilibrium for the exchange rate, This is done by 
defining the dcd and fcd assets as fixed-price stocks, such as monetary 
and other non-marketable debts. Consequently, overall equilibrium is 
brought about by exchange rate adjustment and by adjustment in the 
quantities of the non-marketable debts. 
Quantity adjustment via the capital account is driven by changes 
in demand. The demands for dcd and fcd assets are determined by 
expectations of exogenous interest rates and of endogenous rates of 
exchange rate depreciation. 
The second condition for perfect capital mobility is the 
possibility of unlimited borrowing to finance asset purchases, The 
first condition of zero transactions costs relates to the speed of 
adjustment while the second condition of unlimited borrowing relates to 
the magnitude of asset flows. 
The asset demand equations (3) are now considered. 
relative yield on dcd assets, henceforth the 'relative yield'. It 
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comprises the interest rate differential between dcd and fcd assets 
, 
less the rate of depreciation, e t +1 - e t . Depreciation constitutes a 
capital gain for domestic holders of fcd assets and a capital loss for 
foreign holders of dcd assets. 
(4) 
Risk-neutrality is assumed, limiting agents' concern to the mean 
of the asset yield distributions or to the mean relative yield, Zt' in 
this two asset case. Portfolio decisions are made conditional on 
beliefs of the mean relative yield. If beliefs are of a positive value, 
the agent only holds dcd assets. If beliefs are of a negative value, 
only fcd assets are held. If beliefs are of a zero value, some 
proportion of each asset is held in the portfolio. 
There is a global market of agents with varying beliefs and 
borrowing facilities. We assume that there is no systematic difference 
in beliefs across countries, and that there is orthogonality between 
beliefs and borrowing facilities. Aggregate (global) borrowing 
facilities are H, which is unbounded. 
Given the orthogonality of beliefs and the assumption of risk-
neutrality, the asset demands can be determined by looking at the 
respective proportions of agents who believe that the mean relative 
yield is zero, positive and negative. The proportion .,p believes that z 
is zero; the proportion (1 - ~)r that z is positive; and the 
proportion (1 - ~) (1 - r) that z is negative. Each proportion i~ no 
greater than unity, together adding up to unity. Finally, of the 
proportion, ~, who believe thRt z is zero, 
fcd assets is proportioned ~ and (1 - ~). 
The asset demands at time t are conditional on beliefs at time 
t - 1. The asset demands are: 
'" Df
t (1 .,p) T + J.L.,p ] t-l H 
'" Fd (1 - .,p) (1 - T) + (1 
- J.L) .,p ] t-l H t 
(5) 
'" '" so Df
t + Fdt - H 
H -+ ex) 
because of unlimited borrowing facilities. The capital flows in (3) are 
determined by first differencing the asset demand equations in (5) . .,p 
and J.L are assumed to be constant over time for tractability, so that 
capital flows are driven only by changes in T. 
(1 - .,p) ~T t-l H 
-(1 - .,p) ~Tt-l H 
As there is unlimited borrowing, H is infinite, and capital flows can 
(6) 
potentially be infinite. If the proportion of agents who believe z is 
positive rises (~T > 0) there is a potentially infinite foreign 
accumulation of dcd assets and a potentially infinite domestic 
decumulation of fcd assets. 
However, the adjustment is shouldered by the exchange rate 
clearing the foreign exchange market in equation (2). To ensure that 
this market clears at a non-negative value for the exchange rate, it is 
necessary to place some restrictions on capital flows to prevent a 
Iiegat~ve demand of or a negative supply for foreign exchange, which 
would be reflected by a negative numerator or denominator in equation 
(2). Accordingly, the capital flow terms, if negative, cannot be 
greater in magnitude than the absolute values (always positive) of the 
current account terms. 
-~Fdt ~ Mt ( ~ 0 ) 
-~Dft ~ Xt ( ~ 0 ) 
(7) 
The restrictions are required because domestic speculators can 
only run down their holdings of fcd assets to the extent that domestic 
importers require the foreign exchange, which would be realised, in 
order to buy foreign goods. And, foreign speculators can only run down 
their holdings of dcd assets only to the extent that domestic importers 
require domestic exchange. The possibility that in aggregate domestic 
speculators could sell fcd assets to foreign speculators is precluded by 
the assumption that there is no systematic difference in beliefs across 
countries. 
If, however, there were systematic differences in beliefs across 
countries, then domestic and foreign speculators would agree upon direct 
exchanges of assets. If for example, domestic and foreign speculators 
respectively tended to believe that z was positive and negative, 
domestic speculators would willingly provide foreign speculators with 
fcd assets in exchange for dcd assets, also willingly provided. 
Such a systematic difference in beliefs would have uncertain 
implications for the exchange rate in this model. In this example, 
domestic speculation would raise the demand for domestic currency and 
foreign speculation would raise the demand for foreign currency. In 
terms of equation (2) both the numerator and the denominator would fall 
and one or both could become negative. 
The absence of systemAtic differences in beliefs is ll~ces~ary as a 
rationale of why the numerator and denominator are con~t~ained ~o be 
non-negative. The sellers of fcd assets within the domestic country 
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require domestic buyers in the form of importers and the sellers of dcd 
assets within the foreign country require foreign buyers in the form of 
foreign importers. 
Using the restrictions in (7), the capital flows in (6) and the 
exchange rate equation in (2), we tabulate the level of the exchange 
rate at each direction of change in the proportion of beliefs favouring 
the dcd asset. 
Table 1 
Relationship of Capital Flows and Exchange Rate 
to Change in r 
Change in r 
negative 
zero 
positive 
-x t 
? ? 
-M t 
? 
o 
If the change in r is negative there is a zero demand for domestic 
currency (Xt + Dft 0) and an infinite demand for foreign currency_ 
The obverse holds for a positive change in T. The demands are not 
determined if there is no change in T. In its raw form, the model 
merely presents a problem. If aggregate beliefs are changing, a non-
zero finite value for the exchange rate does not exist. On the other 
hand, if aggregate beliefs are stationary, it is not possible to 
determine what the equilibrium is. The problem is resolved by applying 
the REE solu~ion to the model, which effectively imposes equilibrium by 
definicion. 
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It is first necessary to transpose the results, making them 
accessible to a REE algorithm. The table may be summarized by the 
equation: 
where 1f f(H) -+ exl. 
1f is a monotonically increasing function of H. 
(8) 
In the polar case, not under consideration, where there are no capital 
account movements, 1f is zero and the exchange rate brings current 
account balance. Using the logarithmic form for (8): 
e t (mt - x ) t 1f /).r t-l (9) 
where e t log Et 
mt log Mt 
x t log Xt 
In general terms, the change in aggregate beliefs concerning 
whether z is positive can be related to the change in average beliefs 
concerning the value of z. G is the expectations (or beliefs) operator. 
Let Giz be agent i's belief on the value of z. Gmz is the weighted 
average or market belief on the value of z, where 
Gmz lMi Giz, lMi 1 (10) 
The wi's are the orthogonal weightings representing market power. If 
the distribution of Giz is approximately symmetrical around the mean, 
Gmz, then there is a close positive correspondence between the 
proportion who believe that z is positive, r, and the mean belief, Gmz 
[see Appendix 2.A.l]. So, the change in Gmz is positively related to 
the 
change in r. Time subscripting: 
e /).r t-l 
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e is the coefficient of the value of the mean belief with respect to the 
proportion which believes z is positive. It is derived in Appendix 
2.A.l. 
From the definition of z in (4) and the logarithmic form of the 
exchange rate in (9), we get: 
(12) 
where b 
as ~ = f(H) ~ ~, as H ~ ~ 
Equation (12) gives the structural form for the exchange rate, which is 
determined by the condition of equilibrium on the balance of payments 
comprising the current account and the capital account. Our statement 
of the AMV is that the parameterisation of the capital account is 
infinite, which is represented by the infinitely valued parameter, b . 
. The current account is dwarfed into insignificance. 
The time structure of information is important to this model. The 
exchange rate equilibrium at time t in equation (12) is observed at th~r. 
time. The equilibrium depends on a set of expectations, which are given 
on the right-hand-side. One of these is of the mean value of the 
exchange rate at time t. It is conditioned on information from an 
earlier period, from time t-l. 
This t:onstruction prevents any simultaneity bet~l1een the 
equilibrium and any element within the information set which conditions 
it. Basically, the observed exchange rate is not permitted co e~tcr th~ 
information set of relev8nre to it~ determination. 
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The construction is an application of Hellwig's (1982) point 
limiting the scope of market price, which was made in the context of the 
efficient markets literature. It has important implications for this 
model and for the results obtained in section 2.6. 
The capital account is determined by the change in beliefs of the 
relative yield on dcd to fcd assets. The terms in braces in equation 
(12) are the market beliefs on the relative yields made at times t-l and 
t-2 for times t and t+l, respectively. Their difference determines the 
capital flows at time t and therefore the exchange rate at time t. 
Equation (12) shows that market beliefs of the relative mean yield 
must be stationary between times t-2 and t-l for a finite value for the 
(log of the) exchange rate, if b is unbounded. The REE algorithm, as 
later shown, ensures this stationarity as a necessary condit~on of the 
equilibrium it imposes. Therefore, if learning is considered, with this 
parameterisation, it cannot be that of the relative mean yield, as 
determinacy requires beliefs of a zero and constant relative mean yield. 
2.4 The Real Exchange Rate and the Current Account 
Equation (12) can be transformed into real terms; it is then 
possible to integrate a model of the real exchange rate with a model for 
the current account. It is the real exchange rate, the nominal rate 
adjusted for relative national price levels, which would affect choices 
between home and overseas' goods. The current account is determined 
within a simple two-country macro-model. There are simplifications in 
the common coefficients assumption and the assumptions that real 
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interest rates are exogenous and that income levels are demand 
determined. 
The exogeneity of real interest rates is unquestionably a rather 
strong assumption, but one which is made to overlook the modelling of 
nominal interest rates and of expected inflation rates. An alternative 
possibility is conventionally to model both in terms of the demand and 
supply of money. But the question of the exogeneity of the money supply 
process is itself also a matter of contention. 
Defining variables: c is the real exchange rate, or 
competitiveness; v is the differential of real interest rates; f is 
the log ratio of real exports (nominal deflated by the foreign price 
level) to real imports (nominal deflated by the domestic price level); 
and pd and pf are respectively the domestic and foreign price levels. 
V t 
Substituting the above into equation (12) gives the real exchange rate: 
(13) 
The current account representation, f (henceforth: the 'current 
account') is determined by the two countries' income levels, the 
expected exchange rate and a shock parameter. 
where u' 
t 
s u' + €' 
t-l t 
o s 6 < 1 (14) 
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a o is a constant term. Common magnitudes apply to the income 
elasticities, but different signs, as increases in fore;gn income ra; 
... __ ... se 
foreign imports, increasing domestic exports, and incre~ses in domestic 
income raise domestic imports. 02 is the elasticities of current 
account flows with respect to the (expected) exchange rate. 
A feature of this model is that the expected exchange rate 
influences the current account. It is the expectation made one period 
in advance of the contemporaneous exchange rate. Generally, 02 is 
greater than zero, and greater than unity if the Marshall-Lerner 
condition holds. 2 
There is a stochastic shock, u' which follows a Markov process 
t 
with a white noise, €'. The parameter 0 represents the persistence of 
the shocks, following Taylor (1984). Shocks are transitory if 0 is zero 
and fully permanent if 0 is unity. There are various possibilities of 
intermediate persistence between. 
The process for the income levels are specified, using the 
assumptions that income is demand determined and that real interest 
rates are exogenous. We therefore overlook the aggregate supply and 
curves and consider just the two countries I IS curves: 
ydt fJ 1 gdt - fJ2 rdt _1 + P3 f. to 
yft fJ 1 gft - fJ2 rft _1 - fJ3 f t 
Their government expenditures are gd and gf and their real interest 
rates are rd and rf. Again the common coefficients assumption is in 
operacion. Income in each country is determined by its government 
2 The ~l~sticities or ~xports and (less) imports quantities mu::,L 
exceed unity to counten7ail the valuation effect on imports 
revenue. 
1.:-1 
(15) 
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expenditure, its real interest rate and its state of current account 
balance. These three are represented, respectively, by the terms, gd, 
. 
gf, rd, rf, f and -f. A surplus for the domestic country constitutes a 
deficit for the foreign one. 
A reduced-form for the current account is obtained by substituting 
(15) into (14): 
f t fa + T1 Gmt _1 c t + k v t - 1 + u t (16) 
where u t 0 u t - 1 + f t 
° 
~ 0 ~ 1 f t - NIID (0, G f ) 
where fa [a1 f3 1 (gf - gd) + °0 ] 1 (1 + 201f3 3 ) 
T1 °21 (1 + 201f3 3 ) 
k 01f321 (1 + 201f3 3 ) 
u u'/(l + 201f3 3 ) 
€ f'/(l + 201f3 3 ) 
and v = rd - rf 
Government expenditures are assumed constant in order to limit the range 
of the dynamics. The real interest rate differential is positively 
related to the current account, as a rise causes a relative contraction 
in the domestic country, which causes its imports to fall relative to 
its exports (foreign imports). 
The real exchange rate allowing for interaction with the current 
account is obtained by substituting equation (16) intc (13): 
(17) 
The model is completed by specifying a process for the real 
interest rate differential: 
o ~ 8 < 1 (18) 
It follows a Markov process in the same way as the current account 
shock. It is assumed that the two governments together determine an 
interest rate policy and that they set nominal rates accurately to 
achieve real target rates. If v is positive, there is a relative 
contraction in the domestic country and 8 represents its degree of 
persistence. 
The expected long-run equilibrium of the exchange rate where 0 and 
8 are less than one and where b is finite (imperfect capital mobility) 
may be determined as 
* Gm c (19) 
In expected value, the current account is asymptotically zero because 
capital flows in this case are asymptotically zero in expected value. 
2.5 Rational Expectations Equilibrium 
The REE solution containing the assumption that agents have full 
information of the structural parameters, h, d, g, k and fo' is here 
considered as the benchmark case. Assuming away coordination problems, 
they can solve for the rational expectations reduced-form parameters by 
application of the undetermined coefficients me~hod, which is detailed 
in Appendix 2.A.2. It is then possible tv determine Ar 1" e~ ..u~~inn t-l 
(11) and by inference the parameters, ~ and ~. 
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We give the general REE solution to the model in equation (17) 
where b can take on any value in the subsection immediately below. In 
the following subsection we consider the AMV version as defined in 
section 2.3 where the value of b is unbounded. The final subsection 
looks at the current account in this latter version and the correlation 
between the current account and the exchange rate. 
2.5.1 The General Solution 
All parameter values are known and all information is fully 
exploited. The information of relevance includes that on current 
account shocks and on real interest rate differentials. The price 
variables, the exchange rate and the interest rates, are observed at the 
time of their realisation. However, quantity variables, the current 
account terms, are observed with a lag. The distinction is made on the 
assertion that price data are immediately transmitted through the 
mechanism of a centralised market institution, while the availability of 
quantity data depends on the collection and publication of statistics. 
The equilibrium outcome at time t is conditioned on information 
which is not available at the same time, but at time t - 1. This is to 
ensure that there is no contemporaneous feedback from the observable 
outcome which is conditional on information to the same set of 
information, which would trivialise the informational problems facing 
the agents. 
The rational expectations reduced-form is 
c + ~ w + P t-p L ~ p p-O 
E t-p 
(20) 
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The wand the E are the white noise disturbances in the real interest 
rate differentials and in the current account shocks. c is the long-run 
equilibrium value of the exchange rate. The solution meth0d (shown in 
Appendix 2.A.2) is to substitute (20) into (17), also using (18) for 
consistent expectations of real interest rate differentials, and to 
determine the values of the ~ and ~ coefficients in (20). p p 
The procedure implicitly assumes that there are no coordination 
problems for the agents of the model. It only makes sense for one agent 
to apply the algorithm, if he believes that all others are applying it. 
But this assumption is standard for macroeconomic rational expectations 
models. 
Given that the structural parameter values, 8, 6, ~, k and fo, are 
known, the solution is 
c 
t .. kl.Al + k2.A2'- (so = kl + k2) 
0.5 (1 + 2b)/b ± J [0.25 [(1 + 2b)fD]2 - 1] (21) 
-1 
-6 
The solutions for ~2' ~3' ~4'·· .are given in Appendix 2.A.2. 
~o o (22) 
The solutions for ~l' ~2' ~3' ... are given in Appendix 2.A.2. 
The long-run exchange rate is St - fo/(l + ~), which is 
indeterminate because St is non-unique. The problem of non-uniqup.ness 
is a recognised feature of dynamic REE models (Shillel CL978)], 
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Moreover, there is only one stationary long-run equilibrium in the 
general case where k = 0 1 . 
2.5.2 The Asset Harket View Solution 
Assuming full-information of parameter values, again, this time b 
is unbounded in accordance with our definition of the AMV. The 
coefficient values in (21), (22) and (A.27) and (A.29) in Appendix 2.A.2 
are restricted to 
c 1 (23) 
"Yo -1 
"Y1 -6 
"Yp 0 for p ~ 2 (24) 
1ro 0 
1r -(jP/(l - 8) P for p ~ 1 (25) 
There is again a multiplicity of solutions for the long-run 
exchange rate and so for the current rate, but in this instance each 
solution is stationary. The reason is that the combination of non-
stationarity, leading to non-zero rates of depreciation and non-zero 
relative yields, and an infinite value for b implies that capital flows 
and the (log of the) exchange rate would also be infinite. The REE 
algori~hm in imposing equilibrium on the model must, of necessity, 
impose stationarity to ensure the exis~ence of a finite equilibrium 
where b is infinite. 
Therefore, the existence of non-stationary rational bubbles is 
precluded by the unboundedness of b. If a strong AM\! is r"lkpn '1f 
exchange rate determination, then it is inappropria L:e to mode 1 e:~change 
rate dynamics as Flood and Garber (1980) modelled the German 
hyperinflation. Our result differs from that in Blanchard and Watson 
(1982) because our specification that the real interest rate 
differential converges to zero ensures that the long-run equilibrium is 
in the level of the exchange rate. 
There is only one solution which is consistent with long-run 
current account balance as given by equation (19) in section 2.4. This 
is where So is zero. So, that if agents believe that in the long-run 
there is current account balance, where there will be no net wealth 
transfers between the two countries, then they may pick the unique 
solution given by equation (19). 
Comparing the coefficient values in (22) and (24), it is seen that 
within the AMV only the contemporaneous and first lag of the noise in 
the current account shock can affect of the exchange rate. Outside the 
AMV there is an effect from all lags in the noise, although these 
effects will be very small where b is very large and will geometrically 
decline where the shock persistence is less than perfect. 
The AMV version of the exchange rate is affected only by 
unobservable current account movements which cannot be anticipated. 
There is some analogy to the new-classical macroeconomic models [e.g. in 
Lucas (1972), Sargent and Wallace (1975), and Barro (1976)] where 
unanticipated movements alone in the money supply have real effects. 
Finally, a comparison of (22) and (25) makes apparent that the 
real interest rate differential affects the exchange rata only through 
the capital account within the fu~. There is no effect via the 
relatively contractionary effect on income levels and on import flows, 
because of the parameterisation representing perfect capital mobility. 
The coefficients in (23)-(25) and (A.27) and (A.29) in Appendix 
2.A.2 and equation (18) give the exchange rate with full REE and the AMV 
as 
So - fo/(l + '7) - [0/(1 - 0)] v t - 1 - €t - O€t-l (26) 
The expected mean relative yield can be solved as 
[0 + 02/(1 - 0) - 0/(1 - 0)] o 
for all t. The expected mean relative yield is zero and stationary. 
This is expected interest rate parity for all time periods. This 
precludes the non-existence of a finite exchange rate equilibrium. The 
equilibrium in the case of stationary beliefs, which was indeterminate 
in the table in Section 2.3, is fully determinate inside REE once 
beliefs on long-run current account balance are imposed to overcome the 
multiplicity problem. 
In the AMV case, where the model is determinate and where there 
must be unanimous beliefs in its determinacy, all agents must believe z 
is zero. Therefore in terms of the structural parameters in Section 
2.3, .,p is unity and T and Jl. are indeterminate. The choice-theoretic 
foundations of the model in Section 2.3 are only enlightening outside 
the AMV case, since the distribution of beliefs is trivialised inside 
the AMV case. 3 
3 Beliefs could differ in this case if risk-aversion was adml.tted 
with differing degrees of aversion across agents. 
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2.5.3 The Current Account and the Exchange Rate from the Al1V 
inside REE 
Taking the expected exchange rate from (26) and substituting it 
into (16) gives the current account from the AMV and inside REE: 
f t fa + 'I [so - fo/(1 + 17)] + [k - '1 0/(1 - 0)] v t - 1 + ut (27) 
We want to consider Mussa's (1983) assertion that there is a 
negative correlation between the rate of depreciation and the current 
account. To simplify, we assume that the exchange rate has a unit root, 
which is ensured where 0 = O. The rate of depreciation and the current 
account then become, respectively: 
c t - c t - 1 -€t + (1 - 0) €t-l + 0 €t-Z (28) 
f t fo + 'I [so - fo/(l + 'I)] + k v t - 1 + E t + O€t-l + OZ€t_Z +... (29) 
The covariance between the rate of depreciation and the current account 
is 
where ve is the variance of the white noise in the current account 
shocks. 
(30) 
The covariance is strongest at -a E where thp. ~urrp.nt: .~('('ount 
shocks are transitory (0 = 0) and weakest at zero, where the current 
account shocks are fully permanent (0 = 1). Generally, inside REE from 
an AMV there will be some negative correlation between the rate of 
depreciation and the current account surplus, where the exchange rate 
has a unit root and where the current account shocks are not fully 
permanent. 
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2.6 Deficient Information of Parameter Values 
The purpose of this section is to consider the AMV of the model 
when the information availability assumptions are relaxed. Agents have 
beliefs on the structural parameter values which may not necessarily 
coincide with their actual values. The same REE algorithm is applied, 
but with some miscalculation where beliefs differ from actual values. 
The miscalculation or misanticipation will lead to current account 
effects, even where all the other strong AMV assumptions are maintained. 
It is shown that the capital account is central to the analysis, 
as asset market decisions are conditioned on information, which may be 
erroneous, leading to misanticipations. Agents are limited by the non-
simultaneity of the observed equilibrium with the pertinent information, 
which was discussed at the end of section 2.3 
Our capital account representation (henceforth Ithe capital 
account') is the term b { } on the right-hand side of equation (17). It 
may be determined by adding the exchange rate to the current account as 
(31) 
In terms of the REE and AMV of the previous section, the capital account 
is found by combining (28) and (29) to give 
E t-p (32) 
It is assumed that So is zero, because of beliefs in long-run current 
account balance. 
Equation (32) is based on the assumption that the values, k, 1], fj 
and 0 are known to agents. If agents beliefs on these values, k. ;;, 8 
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" and 5, can differ from their actual values, then a more a2propriate 
capital account form is 
(33) 
The exchange rate expectation determining the current account will also 
be conditioned on agents' beliefs, so that the corresponding form for 
the current account will be 
fo + '7[-fo/(l+~)] + {k - '7[8/(1-8)]] v
t
- 1 + ~ 5P € p=O t-p (34) 
The exchange rate from equations (31), (33) and (34) is 
(35) 
This is a case of the AMV version where information on the values of the 
structural parameters is not necessarily available. 4 Equation (26) is a 
special case of (35), where beliefs and actual values coincide. 
The last term in equation (35) shows that obser'vable positive 
components in the shocks depreciate the exchange rate when their 
" persistence is overanticipated (5 < 5) and appreciate the exchange rate 
" when their persistence is underanticipated (6 > 5). If the degree of 
" persistence is correctly anticipated (5 = 5), then observable shock 
components have no effect on the exchange rate. 
This shows that there are two necessary conditions fer current 
account neutrality: full rational expectations and perfect capital 
mobility with potentially unbounded capital flows. In the previous 
Harris and Purvis (1981) considered a disaggregat..ed currency-
substitution model with confusion between real and monet.ary shocks 
in the context of rational expectations with limited information. 
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section, the first condition without the second delivered current 
account effectiveness. In this section, current account effectiveness 
results with the second condition without the first condition of full 
rational expectations. The analogies are to imperfect wage-price 
adjustment in macro-models of the money and output relationship [Fischer 
(1977) and Phelps and Taylor (1977)] and to deficient information of 
parameter values in the same kinds of model [Taylor (1975) and Friedman 
(1979)] . 
The non-simultaneity between the observation of equilibrium and of 
the information relevant to its determination, discussed above, is 
important to this result. This may be shown by considering a case where 
there is simultaneity. 
In this instance, the observed equilibrium feedsback into the 
information set which determines it through the capital account. Any 
current account movement would potentially disturb the exchange rate, 
but actually send a signal to agents driving the capital account. The 
disturbance is only potential, because the feedback would 'stabilise' 
the equilibrium, given the powerfully orchestrated response from the 
infinitely mobile capital. 
The agents of the model would not need to know the current account 
parameters, because the exchange rate would act as a sufficient 
statistic for their decisions. Consequently, the extent of their 
knowledge of parameters is immaterial to the model's solution, beeau~e 
0f the efficacy of the equilibrium as a signal. 
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In the case considered without this simultaneity, the exchange 
rate is no longer a sufficient_ statistic, so that agents' parameter 
knowledge is important for the solution. If mistakes are made, the 
equilibrium cannot signal these and simultaneously correct itself. 
The mechanism by which observable current account shocks can be 
neutralised from their potential effect on the exchange rate works 
through the capital account. An observed (positive) shock would 
appreciate the exchange rate in the absence of a capital account 
response. There would be a relative demand increase for the domestic 
currency from the current account. But, agents driving the capital 
account perceive, say, at time t-l, the potential fall in the exchange 
rate at time t, and therefore, the potential depreciation at time t+l. 
This induces a capital movement from dcd into fcd assets, as foreign 
holders of dcd assets endeavour to avoid a capital loss and domestic 
holders of fcd assets try to make a capital gain. The capital movement 
raises the relative demand for foreign currency until there is no 
potential depreciation - until it matches the initial increase in 
relative demand for domestic currency determined by the initial current 
account shock. So, the overall effect on the relative demand for 
domestic currency nets out to zero, as the current account influence is 
countered by a capital account response, where the influence is 
perceived and where its persistence is correctly anticipated. 
This scenario is where the persistence of the shock is correctly 
anticipated. There are two other possibilities, where it is over-
anticipated and where it is under-anticipated. Firstly, agents may 
over-anticipate the persistence of the shock, expecting a lar~e~ 
potential depreciation than is warranted. There is consequently ~ too 
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large switch from dcd to fcd assets: the capital account over-reacts. 
The final effect is a depreciation as the rise in the relative demand 
for domestic currency from the current account source is exceeded by the 
rise in the relative demand for foreign currency from the capital 
account response. 
Secondly, agents may under-anticipate the persistence of the 
shock, expecting a smaller depreciation than is warrant2d. The switch 
from dcd into fcd assets is then too small: the capital account under-
reacts. The final effect is an appreciation, because the rise in the 
relative demand for domestic currency from the current account source 
exceeds the rise in the relative demand for foreign currency from the 
capital account response. 
The possibility of misanticipations modifies the relationship 
between depreciation and the current account. The stochastic process 
for depreciation outside full rational expectations is given by 
" 
-€ + (1 - 5) € + [5 - (52 - 52)] 
t t-l 
€ t-p 
from differencing the stochastic process in equation (35). The 
( ~) 6 ) 
covariance between the rate of depreciation and the current account, now 
given by equation (34) [see Appendix 2.A.3] is 
-(1 - 5) 
r I 1 + 52 + 
l 
5;4 
u 
" 1 - 65 
The REE covariance, given before, is the special case where 0 = 6. 
There is now the possibility of a positive covariance where age~ts over· 
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anticipate the persistence of the shocks. For example, let agents 
believe that the persistence is fully permanent (8 = 1). In this event, 
the sufficient condition for a positive covariance is that S is between 
0.755 and 1. High but over-anticipated values for S will increase the 
likelihood of a positive covariance. But, generally, we would expect 
the covariance to be negative. 
2.7 The Revision of Beliefs on the Long-Run Equilibrium 
In a normal state of the world there is little reason to expect 
beliefs to be constant over time. This especially applies where the 
outcomes of agents' decisions, conditioned on their beliefs, are 
inconsistent with these beliefs. Agents would normally revise their 
beliefs outside the state where all information is readily available. 
The literature on learning [reviewed by Blume, Bray and Easley 
(1982)] considers the question of whether beliefs will converge to the 
REE state of the model where all information (on parameter values; is 
available. Such a consideration is interpreted as one of the stability 
of REE, and it therefore helps to assess the validity of using the 
rational expectations hypothesis in economic models. 
Although of interest, this is only one consideration of this 
section, which is to look at the dynamic pattern which learning may 
impart to the model. The revision of beliefs over time may give rise to 
phenomena which can otherwise be attributed to dynamic instabilities 
[discussed more fully in Chapter 3]. A learning process may have 
appearance of a speculative bubble which is extraneous to the 
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fundamentals of the model. But, without discussing the merits of this 
alternative hypothesis, the purpose of this section is to widen the 
analysis to consider learning and to look at the dynamic patterns which 
can emerge. 
A problem with the AMV of the model is that indeterminacy results 
outside of beliefs in REE. An informational equilibrium must be imposed 
to ensure a sensible result where the parameter b is valued towards 
infinity. In a way, this questions the plausibility of such strong 
asset market assumptions. Furthermore, we must specify conditions for 
learning to be compatible with determinacy. 
Where capital flows are potentially unbounded, the compatibility 
of learning and determinacy requires the assumption that agents at least 
believe themselves to be in a state of full REE ex ~~te. There are two 
broad possibilities. One is that each agent is without full information 
of the model's parameter values yet believes the rest of the market to 
be in a state of full REE. This possibility can be justified by the 
lack of coordination between agents caused by their dispersion across a 
decentralised market. 
But a precondition for this first possibility is that agents in 
the market at least know the persistence of the current account shocks. 
If this is not the case, each agent would surely come to perceive some 
effect from the observable shocks to the exchange rate as in equation 
(35). Then the deduction would be made that the rest of the market is 
not in REE. Indeterminacy would result if agents made expectations 
based 0~ t:heir hel ;ef~ of t:he ac.tu.3.1 'J3.luE's in rnniunction with be~i2f: 
- - - --..) 
of market beliefs. Equation (36) shows that where the two differ, the 
expected rate of depreciation would be determined by the observable 
shocks and would be generally non-zero. Indeterminacy results in the 
case of the AMV where the parameterisation of beliefs of expected 
depreciation in the capital account is non-zero. Consequently, 
determinacy within the AMV requires that agents believe that all other 
agents are in REE. 
The problem arises through the parameterisation of the capital 
account part of the model. Instead we could specify the learning of a 
parameter which does not have capital account repercussions. The long-
run equilibrium of the exchange rate as a level does not affect the 
capital account which is determined by expected changes in the exchange 
rate. 
The second possibility is where agents are in a (dynamic) REE, but 
are learning the long-run equilibrium. There are an infinity of 
possibilities because of the dynamic structure of the model [Shiller 
(1978)] and each is fully consistent with REE. In terms of this model 
it is learning the value of So - fo/(l + ~) where there are multiple 
solutions a priori. Learning the long-run equilibrium of a dynamic 
rational expectations model was considered by Gottfries (1985) and F.van~ 
(1985). They considered learning as a more appropriate and more 
economic basis for the selection of a unique value than the selection 
criteria reviewed by Burmeister (1980). [See also Taylor (1977) and 
McCallum (1983)]. 
Gottfries' model differs from ours in that his equivalent 
parameter for b is fini te in value. whi c.h makes for only r')Dr:- ~t.::t:1Cn:lrJ' 
solution with all the rest non-stationary. In our case, as b is 
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infinite in value, there is an infinity of stationary values 
corresponding to different values of so' as shown in Section 2.5. 
In the rest of this section, we consider learning of the long-run 
equilibrium. The learning process is inconsistent with the model being 
learned outside REE as in Cyert and DeGroot (1974), DeCanio (1979), Bray 
(1982) and Bray and Savin (1982). Its justification is the lack of 
information which would otherwise permit agents to coordinate their 
learning strategies, so that learning would have no unanticipated 
effects. Agents cannot coordinate their learning strategies, if they 
are members of a decentralised market. And, as they are individually 
small in relation to the whole market, they may believe that their 
learning activities will have no effect on the model. 
Assuming that the long-run equilibrium is the only unknown 
parameter in the model, the exchange rate is given by 
-
c t = -fa - r; Gmt _1 c - [8/(1 - 8)] v t - 1 - €t - b€t-l (3/) 
-where Gm
t
_
1 
c is the average or market belief at time t-l of the long-
run equilibrium: 
(38) 
Individual beliefs are updated such that the individual belief at 
any time is a weighted average of the average belief at one period 
earlier and of the most recently available information of its value. 
The agent i's belief of the long-run equilibrium at t-l is 
where 0 < Ai t _1 ~ 1. Ai is the weighting on the previous belief in the 
current belief, so it represents (inversely) the speed of learning. The 
individual effectively faces a signal extraction problem because of 
noise in the data he is learning from. The noise comes from the 
unobservable current account shocks. 
The term in [ ] in equation (39) is the signal of the long-run 
equilibrium which is generated by the model. It is deduced from 
observing the exchange rate at time t-l and from knowing the expected 
path of future real interest rate differentials accumulated as 
[B/(l - B)] v t -z ' Information on the long-run equilibrium is received in 
this signal, which is clouded by noise from the as yet unobservable 
current account shocks, €t-1 and €t-z' Average or market beliefs at time 
t-2 also bear upon the signal received by individuals at time t-l which 
feeds into beliefs. So there is feedback from the beliefs at an 
aggregate level to the signal itself. 
If agents are Bayesians, then the weightings must be constrained 
to make learning consistent with optimal decision theory [DeGroot 
(1970)] . 
A it hi t _1/hit 
hit hit _1 + [( 1 + Sz) (1] -1 for each i. 
hit is the Bayesian precision of i's belief on the long-run equilibrium 
at time t. It corresponds with the mean of his distribution of belief3. 
[(1 + Sz) (1]-1 is the precision of the signal, which is assumed 
to be known to agents. It is the inverse of the joint variance of the 
unobservable shocks. 
We assume orthogonality between t:he precision of beli.e.fs, ).i, 
weight of the agent in the market, wi, ~nd the mean belief, Gic. 
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~ggregate learning is then given by 
where Gm
t
_1 c 
Amt _1 Gmt _2 c + (1 - Amt _1 ) [ - fo - f"J Gmt _Z c 
- €t - O€t-l] 
l. 
The equilibrium from learning is in the limit given where 
where aggregated beliefs are unchanging, where 
Gm c 
(40) 
This is the unique value where so is zero - of long-run current account 
balance. 
This result obtains because of the static structure of 
expectations in the current account side of the balance of payments. 
That is to say, expectations of the exchange rate at time t determine 
the current account balance, which enters the equation for the exchange 
at time t. Given the static structure of expectations, there is a 
unique long-run equilibrium if reference is made only to the current 
account. [See the discussion in Chapter 3.] 
Moreover, the long-run equilibrium in question is a level, which 
is relevnnt only to the current account, and not a rate of change (of 
depreciation) which is relevant only to the capital account. 
Consequently, learning is made only with r.ef~r.ence to ~h~ current 
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account side which has a static structure of expectations and a unique 
equilibrium. 
This unique equilibrium is consistent with current account balance 
because of the set-up of the model. Excluding the capital account (and 
the intervention account), the identity that the total balance of 
payments is zero translates into one of zero balance on the remaining 
current account. This exclusion is implicitly made by agents who learn 
the long-run level of the exchange with sole reference to the current 
account. 
Agents need not know the long-run equilibrium which is consistent 
with current account or even that it is consistent with current account 
balance. A process of stable learning will deliver an equilibrium 
belief which brings current account balance in the long-run. The reason 
for this strong result is that the model allows for current account 
interaction with the learning process. Beliefs affect the current 
account which directly a~fects beliefs on its long-run value and on the 
level exchange rate. There is no capital account reaction since there 
is no effect on the expected rate of change of the exchange rate. A 
revision in beliefs affects the exchange rate signal on which agents are 
revising their beliefs. 
The stability of learning, assuming a constant rate of adjustmentS 
in equation (40) is clearly defined by the composite of parameters 
Am - ry(l - Am) 
Positive serial correlation and instability is precluded as 0 < ~m < 1 
and ~ > O. Negative serial correlation and inRtability is a p0ssibilir~ 
5 Turnovsky (1969) treats adaptive expectations as a sDecial case of 
Bayesian learning. 
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where ry > (1 + Am)/(l - Am). This is arguably not the case where the 
elasticities of exports and imports are weak and where learning is 
relatively sluggish (where kIn is close to one). The dynamics of 
learning will be (stable) positive where kIn/(l - kIn) > g, where the 
revision of beliefs is relatively sluggish and where the elasticities 
are weak; and negative, if otherwise. 
Following a perturbation in the parameter f determined bv a 0' .I 
change in relative (fixed) government expenditure, a plausible scenario 
is of a period of stable learning with positive serial correlation in 
the exchange rate. This differs from the exponential growth pattern 
expected from many models of speculative bubbles. 
And, given the posited adjustment process, the exchange rate will 
be seen to overshoot its new long-run equilibrium as beliefs lag behind 
this new value. For example, if ry is 1 and fa is 0.10, the long-run 
equilibrium is -0.05. Suppose that fa rises from 0.10 to 0.14, because 
relative (fixed) government expenditure rises in the foreign country 
[see the definition of fo below equation (16)]. According to equation 
(38), there will be an immediate appreciation of 80% to 0.09 before a 
process of stable learning depreciates the exchange rate by 22% to its 
new long-run equilibrium value of -0.07. 
Overshooting occurs because the revision of beliefs is sluggish or 
less than instantaneous with the immediate adjustment of actual values. 
And, for plausible assumptions about the export and import elasticities, 
~tabi1ity will ensure convergence to an equilibrium consistent with 
current account balance, whether this is anticipated or n0~ 
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APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 2 
2.A.l The Determination of E 
The constant proportion, (1 ~), believes that z is non-zero, and 
of this proportion, T, and so, (1 ~)T overall believes that z is 
positive. Within the proportion (1 - ~) (non-zero) beliefs are normally 
distributed 
Giz N (Gmz', a ) 
z 
(A.I) 
Gmz' and a are the mean and variance of beliefs within this set. The 
z 
overall mean, including the proportion, ~ believing that z is zero is 
Gmz (1 - ~) Gmz' + ~.O (1 - ~) Gmz' (A.2) 
The distribution within (1 - ~) is represented by the probability 
density function: 
f(Giz) (A.3) 
so that 
(1 - ~)T s: f(Giz) dGiz (A.4) 
The change is the proportion (1 - ~)T with respect to the change in Gmz' 
is 
0(1 - ~)T (1 - 'if;) (21ra ) 0.5 exp [0. Sa -1 Gm~' 2] z z 
oGrnz' 
As ~ is constant, inversion gives 
oGmz' 
OT 
which is always non-negative. In the AMV case where Gmz' ~ 0, 
(A.s) 
(A.6) 
a -+ 0 
7. ' 
we assume that the mean and variance tend to their limits at rates which 
ensure e is non-zero. 
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2.A.2 The REE Solution 
Equation (17) gives the structural-form of the model: 
-f - '1 Gmt _1 c t - k v t - 1 - ut + b { Gmt _1 (c t +1 - c t - vt ) 0 
- Gmt _Z (c t - c t - 1 - v t - 1)} 
where v
t BVt _1 + wt w - NIID (0, G ) t w 
oU
t
_1 + €t € - NIDD (0, G€) t 
We specify the rational expectations reduced-fo~: 
(20) 
where c is the long-run equilibrium of the exchange rate, w
t 
and €t are 
the exogenous real interest rate differential shocks and the exogenous 
current account shocks, respectively. 1r(L) and 'Y(L) are the polynomials 
in the lag operators: 
1r(L) 1ro + 1rlL + 1r LZ + 1r LP (A.7) Z p 
'Y(L) + 'Y1L Z + 'Y LP (A.8) 'Yo + 'YzL p 
The REE solution is obtained by substituting the reduced-form intu 
the structural-form for the expectations terms, and then solving the 
reduced-form coefficients, given the consistency of the structural-form 
with the reduced-form. 
Expectations made at time t-l exploit all information available al 
that date, which comprises current account shocks up until time t-2 and 
real interest rate shocks up until time t-l. So, generally, 
(A.9) 
where I t - 1 ( .. ) (A.IO) 
Th~ mechan"i ('~ 0f the solution may be ~ho'''''Tl l.l:. the 
below. 
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- --
Coeff-
icient 
on 
wt TIO 
w TIl t-l 
t-2 TI2 
t-3 TI3 
t - Ij TI /j 
t -y 0 
t - 1 Yl 
t-2 Y2 
t-3 Y1 
t - I, 'Y L, 
----_._---
TABLE 2 
Substitution of Rational Expectations Reduced-form into the Structural-form 
- - - - - -
b Gmt_lct+l -(b+ )Gmt_lc t -bGmt _2 c t bGmt _2 c t_l -bGmt_lvt bGmt _2v t_l -kv 1 t- -u t 
.•. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
bTI2 - (b+nhTl 0 0 -b 0 -ke -
bTI3 - (b+n)n 2 
-
bTI2 bTI1 -be 2 bG -ke2 -
bTI L~ - (b+n)n 3 
-
bTI3 bTI2 _be 3 b0 2 -kG 3 -
bIT 5 - (b+n)TI 4 
-
bIT4 hTI3 -be4 b0 3 _ ke
LI 
-
0 0 0 0 - - - -1 
0 0 0 0 - - - -0 
by 3 - (b+I))Y2 0 0 2 - - - - l) 
hy I, -(h+T\)Y3 
-bY3 bY2 - - - - l )3 
by 5 - (b+I))YL, -bYL, bY3 - - - SLI - l 
c-. ____ ... 
- ~- --- ---- -----_. 
(j\ 
w 
The reduced-form coefficients are the horizontal sums of the 
tabulated values: 
1('0 
1(' 
p 
o 
[b 1('2 - B (b + k)] x 
[b (1('P+1 + 1('P_1) - (B - 1) bBP-1 - kBP] Y 
for p ~ 2 
"10 -1 
"11 -8 
"12 [b "13 - 8
2 ] X 
"Ip = b ["IP+1 + "IP- 1 - 8
P ] Y 
for p ~ 3 
where x-1 1 + b + '7 
_1 Y • 1 + 2b + '7 
(A.ll) 
(A. 12) 
(A.13) 
(A. 14) 
(A. IS) 
(A.16) 
(A.17) 
It is clear from the above that there is a pattern of geometric decline: 
1(' 
P 
for p ~ 3 
for p ~ 4 
Me and Mo are 3 x 3 matrices of coefficients relating 
endogenous coefficient to the endogenous coefficients. 
[ 1('1 ] [ :: 1 r (B(b + x)x 1 1('2 Me (B - 1) bBi + k2yB 1('3 (B - 1) bB Y + kB 3y 
r "12 ] [ 72 1 [ 82x 1 63y J l "13 Mo "13 J ~ "14 "14 84y 
The solution is clearly 
where I is the identity matrix. 
(A.18) 
(A.19) 
the 
(A.20) 
(A.21) 
(A.22) 
(A.23) 
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And, 
Mi 
[ ~y bx 0 ] 0 by by byi 
(I - M.)-l D. -1 [ 1 - by(i + by) bx(1 - iby) l. l. 
by(1 - iby) 1 - iby 
(by)2 by 
D. = (1 - iby) (1 - bxby) _ (by)2 l. 
i = 8, 0 
The Asset Market Case: b ~ ~ 
In the asset market case 
As b ~ ~ 
so 
[ 
3 - 28 
2 - 8 
1 
.:.L 
~ 1-8 
And, from (A.18) and (A.27) 
'If ~ 
p for p ~ 1 
4 - 28 
4 - 28 
2 
8 
n 
] (8 - 1) 8/2 (8 - 1) 82/2 
bx by ] 
by 
1 - bxby 
h · . 1 . f ;' T U' -1 b Tlere 1S an equ1va ent expreSS10n or \~ - no) , ut as 
[ ~ ] 
and because of (A.19) 
..., ~ 0 
p for p ~ 1 . 
as x, y ~ 0 
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(A.24) 
(A.25) 
(A.26) 
(A.27) 
(A.28) 
(A.29) 
(A.30) 
2.A.3 The Covariance Becween Depreciation and the Current Account 
Outside REE 
Equations (34) and (36) give a covariance between depreciation and 
the current account as 
{-I + 6(1 - 6) + 62 [6 - (6 2 _ 52)] 
+ ~ 6P [6 P- 1 - oP) - (op-l - 5P )] (7 ~ 
p=3 " 
] G f CA.3l) 
Proof that the covariance can be positive 
The covariance is positively related to beliefs on the persistence 
of the shocks, 8. We consider the case where 8 is set at its maximum 
value, approximately unity. The covariance expression then becomes 
-(1 -0) [1 + 02 + ~" - .-£ ] (7f 
l-o~ 1-0 
(A.32) 
The value of this is clearly positive where 0 exceeds 0.755 and greatest 
as 6 approaches one. So po::;itive covariance is plau::;il>le where Lhe 
shocks are over-anticipated and fairly persistent. 
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GLOSSARY 
the domestic price of foreign currency 
imports revenue 
exports revenue 
change in foreign holdings of domestic assets 
change in domestic holdings of foreign assets 
relative yield on domestic assets 
the (nominal) interest rate differential 
the log of E 
the domestic (log) price level 
the foreign (log) price level 
the real (log) exchange rate 
the current account shock 
the real interest rate differential 
noise in u, e 
-
NIID (0, CT e ) 
noise in v, w - NIID (0, CTW ) 
the real log ratio of exports to imports 
the constant term in f 
the long-run real (log) exchange rate 
the proportion which believes z = ° 
the proportion which believes z > ° 
the proportion which believes z < ° 
of ~, the proportion holding dcd assets 
of ~, the proportion holding fcd assets 
the 'asset market coefficient' 
t~e persistence of real interest rate differentials 
the persistence of icurrent nccount shcck~: 
the 'elasticities' coefficient 
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'the asset market view' 
o ::5 B < 1 
o ::5 0 < 1 
CHAPTER 3 
THE REVISION OF BELIEFS AS OPPOSED TO THE BUBBLE 
HYPOTHESIS AS A DATA GENERATING PROCESS 
69 
SYNOPSIS 
Evidence such as the overvaluation and then the fall of the dollar 
over 1982-1987 is suggestive that it may be inappropriate to model the 
exchange rate within a purely fundamental framework. This leaves at 
least three broad possibilities: rational expectations bubbles, non-
rational expectations bubbles and a dynamic process caused by the 
revision of beliefs in a state of imperfect information. 
We reject the first two possibilities, the general bubble 
hypothesis, on theoretical grounds by considering Benjamin Friedman's 
(1979) analysis, which dichotomises the information availability 
assumption and the information exploitation assumption of rational 
expectations. If the relevant informational is not fully available, it 
will not be possible for agents to form rational expectations, which 
precludes the possibility of rational bubbles. Furthermore, if the 
limited information available is fully exploited, as a tenet of 
individual optimality, non-rational bubbles, which are founded on ad hoc 
expectations schemes, will also be precluded. 
The hypothesis which we advance is of a dynamic process caused by 
the revision of beliefs in an environment of limited information. 
Accepting the exploitation assumption, but rejecting the availability 
ass'~ption, we envisage a process where agents revise their beliefs in 
response to sequentially received but imperfect information. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Fundamental models of the exchange rate have failed to explain a 
data consisting of wild cyclical movements. A fundamental model is one 
dra~rn from economic theory. And in the case of an asset market example 
with forward expectations, it is usually postulated that the fundamental 
model is one which has a stationary rational expectations solution. 
Meese and Rogoff (1983A and 1983B) found that a selection of 
theoretical models could not improve on the predictions of random walk 
models for three dollar exchange rates. This result has been considered 
the more remarkable because the actual realisations of explanatory 
variables were used as proxies for the corresponding expectations, 
eliminating expectationa1 errors. Hacche and Townend (1981) concluded 
that the existing state of economic knowledge could not account for the 
behaviour of sterling over 1972-1980. 
One possibility is that the theoretical models of the exchange 
rate are misspecified, that there are errors in variables and missing 
variables problems. But the hypothesis which is more often maintained is 
that it is inappropriate to look at asset prices in the context of a 
fundamental model with a stationary REE solution. This is to consider 
the presence of bubbles in the exchange rate. It was Flood and Garber 
(1980) who defined a bubble as the departure of market price from the 
level dictated by market fundamentals. 
We have defined the fundamencal price in terms of a stationary 
REE. There are broadly two possible kinds 0.f hllbhl p., o!,p. \o!hpre 
expectations are rational but not stationary and the other where 
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expectations are not rational. The terms of rational bubble and of 
irrational bubble will be applied respectively to each of these 
possibilities. 
It is possible to reject each bubble possibility on theoreti.cal 
grounds with regard to Benjamin Friedman's (1979) dichotomy between the 
information availability assumption and the information exploitation 
assumption of rational expectations. If agents do not plausibly hold 
the relevant information to form rational expectations, rational bubbles 
are precluded. If, however, they are individually optimal, fully 
exploiting the limited information which is available, then we must rule 
out the ad hoc expectations schemes which would give rise to non-
rational bubbles. 
It is the purpose of this paper to advance an alternative to the 
bubble hypothesis. Briefly stated, it is proposed that foreign exchange 
markets are subject to dynamic processes caused by the revision of 
beliefs, even in the absence of bubbles. The process of agents revising 
their beliefs or, more succinctly, of learning, accounts for a great 
part of the data and explains the departure from the economic 
fundamentals in their narrowest sense. 
An environment of learning where beliefs are revised in accordance 
with sequentially received but limited information is consistent with 
our a priori rejection of the availability assumption and acceptance of 
the exploitation assumption. We also advance additional theoretical 
arguments against the presence of rational bubbles in the foreign 
o.Yrhange market. 
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Section 3.2 investigates the possibility of rational bubbles, 
which are also often referred to in the literature as sunspots and 
bootstrap equilibria. We review some of the various types of rational 
bubble. Theoretical reasons are advanced to propose that their presence 
is generally unlikely and also specifically with reference to the 
foreign exchange market. An exploding real exchange rate bubble is an 
implausible scenario because of the consequences on the current account 
balance and for external indebtedness. 
Section 3.3 looks first briefly at the Peso problem, which we view 
as a problem which belongs essentially to the short-run, and then at 
irrational bubbles emanating from model-inconsistent expectations. In 
one example, given by Armington (1986), myopic agents fail to take into 
account the presence of a unique and stationary long-run equilibrium to 
stabilise their expectations. In a second example, the Frankel and 
Froot (1986) model, expectations can be backward looking and chartist. 
Irrational bubble models, which rely upon agents persisting with sub-
optimal forecasting rules, clearly violate the assumption that 
information is fully exploited. 
Section 3.4 establishes the model, a restricted form of that in 
Chapter 2. This leads us into the main part of this chapter in section 
3.5, a model of individually rational agents persisting with a process 
of learning in order to be able to form optimal forecasts. The range of 
learning possibilities within an economic model is, of course, 
extensive. We consider the learning of a parameter whic~ is determined 
by the joint policies of two governments. 
73 
74 
The interest rate differential between the two countries is 
determined by a Markov process. Our apology for this over-
simplification is mitigated by our primary' desire to isolate the 
phenomenon of specific interest, the effect of learning on the dynamics 
of the model. Furthermore, this process ~ay be regarded as the reduced-
form which could be obtained from a fuller structural modelling of the 
economy. 
Agents endeavour to learn the Markov parameter, which has the 
clear interpretation as the degree of persistence of policy differences 
between the two countries. If a country is subjected to a domestic 
monetary policy, which is relative tight to that pursued abroad, and/or 
a relatively loose fiscal policy, there should be a positive real 
interest rate differential favouring that country. The persistence of 
the differential reflects the persistence of globally imbalanced 
stabilisation policies. 
Agents learn from experiencing the history of policy and use 
Bayesian methods. The advantage in these, apart from their optimality, 
is that they give scope for prior beliefs to affect the model, giving 
some further insight. The process of updating contributes a source of 
dynamics to the model, a process which might otherwise be attributed to 
bubble phenomena. 
Some simulations are presented, showing that the interaction of the 
interest rate differential process with the learning process will give 
rise and falls in the exchange rate away from its equilibrium level. 
The analysis is then related, discursively, to the behaviour of the 
J 
Dollar in the 1980's. It is suggested that the rise and fall of the 
Dollar real exchange rate over this period is not only attributable to 
the relative !ise and fall of US interest rates, but also to the upward 
and downward revisions in beliefs regarding the persistence of the 
policies pursued. 
3.2 Rational Bubbles 
3.2.1 Multiplicity 
The consideration of bubbles is a break from the fundamental 
framework. Flood and Garber (1980) defined a bubble as a departure of 
price from market fundamentals. 1 Rational bubbles owe their existence 
to the possible multiplicity of solutions in dynamic rational 
expectations models, where all but one is consistent with fundamentals. 
The other solutions may admit an extraneous term, which is fully 
consistent with self-fulfilling expectations. We refer to the models of 
Black (1974), Flood and Garber (1980), Azariades (1981) and Blanchard 
and Watson (1982) - to name a few. 
Consider the model: 
c t 
I () 1<1 
(1) 
(2) 
E is the rational expectations operator and c is the logarithm of price. 
Et - l c t is the rational expectation formed at time t-1 (fully exploiting 
all the information then available) of the price at time t. The 
1 Empirically, the bubble hyothesis is difficult ~o separ.:=.tt:: L:Ulli 
that of model misspecification. [See Hamilton and Whiteman (1985) 
and Evans (1986).] 
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contemporaneous expectation for the rate of price change is therefore, 
Et - l (ct+l - c t )· We include a constant term, k, plus an exogenous 
, 
variable, v, which follows a Markov process and has a white-noise error. 
A standard solution procedure is to find the undetermined 
coefficients in the rational expectations reduced-form below by its 
substitution into the structural-form above. 
(3) 
B is an extraneous element or bubble which is fully consistent with the 
form of the dynamic expectations model. It is a deterministic bubble -
and is known alternatively as a sunspot or a bootstrap equilibrium - to 
be distinguished from the short-lived probabilistic bubble, which is 
considered afterwards. We solve the coefficients as 
~o k/(l - al) c 
~l - a3 8/[1 - (al + a2(8 - 1»] (4) 
[ 1 + a2 - al ] t Bt BO 
a2 
Note that it is the dynamic nature of expectations and not their 
rational expectations per se which gives rise to the bubble. Neither is 
the solution method responsible. Blanchard (1979A) takes a different 
approach in presenting a dynamic solution as any weighted average of the 
forward and backward solution. As there are infinite possibilities fn~ 
the weights, there are an infinite number of possible solutions. In a 
restricted case of a static structure of expectations where a2 - 0, ch~ 
only feasible solution is where Bt - 0 for all values of t, including O. 
So the problem does not occur in Muth's (1961) model o~ the cob-web. 
As the model stands, there is an infinity of possible REE 
solutions corresponding to an infinity of possible values of BO. The 
starting point, BO' can be likened to the indeterminate constant of 
integration from a difference equation. Flood and Garber (1980) claim 
that 
, .. the indeterminacy arises because only one market-equilibrium 
condition exists; but the researcher requires two solutions for 
two endogenous variables - market price and the expected rate of 
price change.' 
The dynamic pattern of the bubble clearly depends on the sign and 
magnitude of (1 + Q2 - Q1)/a2 in equation (4). If the magnitude is less 
than unity, then the bubble will collapse asymptotically. However, 
consideration is usually given to the case where it is greater than 
unity. which gives rise to a growing bubble. If the starting value of B 
is positive, the bubble is said to be explosive; and if it is negative, 
the bubble is implosive. Exploding bubbles give rise to a price path 
which is unbounded asymptotically, imploding bubbles will cause the 
price to be asymptotically zero (as the logarithm of the price level in 
the model will become negative and unbounded). 
The case most usually considered is the one where the price is a 
positive function of the expected change in price, as in Shiller (1978). 
It applies to models of hyperinflation, where the demand for real money 
balances is viewed as a negative function of the rate of expected 
inflation, as in ~agan (1956), and to asset demand models where only the 
rate of expected price change is of importance. This gives the 
parRmetp.: restriction 
o 
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The bubble will grow by the factor, (1 + 02)/02' Out of the infinity of 
possible solutions, all but one are explosive. The stationary solution 
is the only 'fundamental' one. 
However, in Chapter 2 we considered a special case of this where 
the parameter represented by 02 (b) was unbounded. In this case, there 
is still the problem of multiplicity, but each possible solution is a 
constant. This characteristic derives from the treatment of perfect 
capital mobility and is consistent with (uncovered) interest rate 
parity. 
Finally, an unappealing feature of the rational expectations 
bubbles discussed so far is their longevity. It is a consensus view 
that if exploding bubbles are possible, they must have a limited life-
span and, so, a good chance of bursting. Afterall, evidence shows that 
hyperinflations do not necessarily persist. Probabilistic bubbles were 
firs~ considered by Blanchard (1979B) and are discussed by Dornbusch 
(1982) with reference to the exchange rate. 
Defining p (which is valued between zero and one) as the 
probability of the bubble being sustained, the expected price at timp-
t+l becomes 
(5) 
Given our parameter restrictions on 01' the effect will be for the 
bubble to grow by an even greater factor, (1 + 02)/P 02' The bubble 
must grow faster in order to compensate agents for the probab~lity of 
its bursting. A problem with this model is that as the probability 0: 
the bubble continuing gets smaller, rhp expp-ct~d bubhl~ get~ ,~---­~ e~~· 
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A more serious problem is that there is no expla~ation of how the 
bubble can burst and no information on which agents can condition their 
expectations of its bursting. How do agents arrive at their expected 
value for p? The probabilistic rational bubble is subject to a 
criticism by Lucas (1981) that rational expectations are applicable only 
where 
\ .. the probabilities of interest concern a fairly well defined 
recurrent set event, situations of "risk" in Knight's 
terminology.' 
3.2.2 Obtaining a Unique Solution 
It is an interesting question whether bubbles are an economic 
problem or an economist's problem? That is to say, do rational bubbles 
exist in the world which the economist is trying to model or are they 
they merely outcome of imperfect modelling practises, for example in the 
use of only one equation where there are two to explain two endogenous 
variables? 
One is reminded of Brainard and Tobin's (1968) recommendation: 
, .. we argue for the importance of explicit recognition of the 
essential interdependences of markets in theoretical and empirical 
specifications ... Failure to respect some elementary 
interrelationships .. can result in inadvertent but serious errors 
of econometric inference and of policy.' 
In spite of this, the returns to a sufficiently general equilibrium 
approach to modelling will be limited, if one is trying to describe a 
real world economic system, which is ~tself underdetermined. Missi~g 
~quations may be mere reflections of missing m~~kets. C2SS p.nrl ~hpll 
(1983) give this explanation for the possibility of bubbles. 
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In the rest of this section we consider whether it is appropriate 
to model the exchange rate as a bubble or as a unique and stationary 
equilibrium. The literature has generally been concerned with 
indeterminate paths in the price level which derive from Cagan money 
demand functions. One approach from Sargent and Wallace (1973) has been 
to select a unique and a non-explosive solution path. Taylor (1977) and 
McCallum (1983) recommended respectively solutions with minimum variance 
and the minimum number of state variables. The speciality of this 
latter criterion has been questioned by Backus (1985). Another approach 
has been to investigate the dynamic properties in term of an underlying 
model of optimising agents - as in the papers of Brock (1975) and Gray 
(1984). [For a brief survey see Burmeister (1980).] 
An alternative criterion has been to focus on the stability or the 
process towards the REE rather than on the stability of the price path 
within the equilibrium. This draws on the literature of learning 
towards rational expectations, reviewed by Bray, Blume and Easley 
(1982), which interprets the stability of REE in terms of the 
convergence of learning processes towards it. The analysis considers 
whether agents, who are initially outside REE, can effectively learn the 
parameters of the model to form rational expectations. The operational 
use of rational expectations in general can then be justified on the 
grounds of convergent learning processes. 
Consequently the application of a particular REE path can be 
justified by the same criterion. A rational expectations bubble is the~ 
seen :s economically feasible, if agents were able to cOnVtHg.e: un ~uc-h 
an equilibrium. Papers by Evans (1985) and by Gottfries (1.985) suggest 
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that agents would find difficulty in learning a non-stationary 
equilibrium. Agents may be able to converge on to a stationary (landed) 
aeroplane, but not to on one which has taken off. In the class of 
models discussed, the unique stationary equilibrium would then dominate 
all others. 
Apart from these general considerations, there is one which 
applies particularly to a model of the real exchange rate. There are 
good reasons to expect a unique and stable solution for its long run 
equilibrium. We are returning to the issue of a second equation; a 
well developed model can give unique solutions both for current price 
and for expected future price. The second equation could define the 
condition of long-run purchasing power parity, as in the case of the 
(sticky-price) monetary model of Dornbusch (1976), or the condition of 
long-run current account balance as in Kouri (1976) and Dornbusch and 
Fischer (1980) [as in the previous chapter]. In the terminology of 
Isard (1981), the long-run exchange rate, ho~vever determined, serves as 
an 'anchor' to the model. 
We prefer the condition of long-run current account balance as 
being consistent with the balance of payments approach in Kouri and in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. The real exchange rate affects the current 
account balance, which constitutes an international transfer of wealth. 
An exploding real exchange rate would lead to not only ~urrent account 
deficits on an unsustainable scale but also of increasing magnitude. If 
the currant account is viewed as a mechanism for redistributing wealth 
between countries, a long-run condition for the internatior.~l 
distribution of wealth translates into a long-nIt'! condition for the real 
exchange rate via the current account. 
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The imposition of a terminal condition will make far-sighted agents 
perceive a binding constraint on the long-run equilibrium. And, with 
speculation based on forward-looking expectations, the current exchange 
rate will be linked to the perceived and finite long-run equilibrium. 
Speculation will then be stabilising as envisaged by Friedman (1953). 
And, given the high degree of rationality which is usually assumed, far-
sighted agents will rule out even short-term deviations of the exchange 
rate from the stable path. 
This therefore applies as equally to the question of short-lived 
stochastic bubbles considered by Blanchard (1979A) and by Dornbusch 
(1982) as well to the standard long-lived bubbles. This is because it 
is a feature also of models of probabilistic bubbles that agents cannot 
perceive a finite solution for the long-run equilibrium. Krugman (1985) 
has forcefully argued the case against the dollar having been on a 
stochastic bubble, because rational agents would have foreseen the 
implications for US external deficits and spiralling indebtedness of an 
unrealistically large scale. 
Chapter 2 considered a model where the real exchange rate was 
determined by the condition of equilibrium on the total balance of 
payments. This gave the characteristic of direct feedback from the 
current account to the exchange rate. It was shown that if agents did 
not know the long-run equilbrium for the exchange rate, it could be 
learned from a reduced-form exchange rate equation which was obtained 
from two separately identifiad structural equations for the cxchang~ 
rAtp. A!!d for the current: account balance. 
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A second characteristic of this model was a multiplicity of 
stationary REE prior to learning. The use of a convergent learning 
mechanism in eliminating non-stationary equilibria has already been 
noted. The learning mechanism in this model, however, was shown to 
ensure convergence to the unique equilibrium which was consistent with 
current account balance. 
Finally, although the real exchange rate is the subject of this 
paper, the nominal exchange rate will also be stationary, if the 
relevant national price levels are stationary. The real exchange rate 
between two countries is defined as the nominal market exchange rate 
deflated by their relative price levels. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983 and 
1986) show that when the government fractionally backs the currency by 
guaranteeing a minimal real redemption value for money, deterministic 
and probabilistic price level bubbles are ruled out. The general 
sentiment that the monetary authorities can and will intervene to 
mitigate excessive price instability should ensure against nominal 
exchange rate bubbles. 
3.3 Alternative Explanations 
3.3.1 The Peso Problem 
The Peso problem is considered first because it bears the closer 
resemblance to rational ex~ectations. It arises in markets whe!e 
forward expectations must be made of future variables, which are ~ot 
determined by a well defined process [see Salnnt and Henderson (1978)]. 
Tt ~onsequp.ntly hRS a strong application to models where pc)li~y 
variables have an effect and where the future policy decisions of chc 
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authorities are difficult to pin down. Expectations can therefore be 
quite chimeral and volatile. 
Dornbusch (1982) relates the behaviour of the French Franc over 
1925-1926 where expectations of inflationary policies led to a collapse. 
This was then followed by a rapid appreciation on the realisation that 
these policies had not materialised. This kind of episode is the most 
relevant whe~e it is probable that the structure of policy will change, 
because of an imminent change in a government, or of a personality 
within it, or because of an overwhelming change in external 
circumstances. 
rne Peso problem can surely be a considerable source of exchange 
rate instability, at least in the short-run. However, in the medium-
term when a sufficient time span will permit agents to learn the 
underlying environment of policy, the Peso problem will be of less 
importance. It is suggested that the Peso problem cannot account for 
longer lasting departures in the exchange rate from notions of its 
equilibrium level, such as the dollar over 1982-1987. 
3.3.2 Non-rational Bubbles 
Exchange rate movements might be considered outside the framework 
of REE. In this subsection we refer to two non-rational bubble models 
given by Armington (1986) and by Frankel and Froot (1986). However, as 
early as 1944, before rational expectations ideas took sway, Nurkse 
argued that the exchange rate was prone to destabilising speculatiuIlS 
caused by extrapolative expectations. 
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Armington's (1986) model acknowledges the existence of long-run 
fundamentals, but contains myopic agents who do not take these into 
account. He notes that the stability problem in rational expectations 
models is caused by too much speculation, while his form of cyclical 
instability is caused by too little far-sighted speculation. In the 
first instance, the lack of a unique and stable long-run equilibrium 
ensures chat self-fulfilling expectations follow an unstable path. In 
his instance, the failure of agents to see further towards the long-run 
fundamentals leads to destabilising speculation. 
Frankel and Froot (1986) describe a different kind of bubble. 
Expectations can be fundamentalist, chartist or any combination of the 
two. TIiere are two groups of agents who make expectations, the 
fundamentalists and the chartists, and a third group, the portfolio-
managers, which makes decisions based on a weighted average of the two 
forms of expectations. 
The non-rational element in the model derives from the condition 
that at any time some weight may be given to the expectations of the 
chartists. The model is only rational in the event that only 
fundamentalist expectations are considered. And, if chartists 
expectations are considered, fundamentalist expectations themselves 
become non-rational, because they lose consistency with the model in 
failing to account for the effect of chartist expectations. 
A bubble starts off from the position where only fundamentalist 
expactations are considered. Then chartist expectations then gain 
credibility, the bubble grows; then chartist expectations lose 
8S 
credibility, leading to a decline in the bubble until the original state 
is reached, where only fundamentalist expectations are considered. 
A main problem with the model is in explaining how the bubble 
starts and evolves. The question is why should the portfolio-managers 
suddenly consider the extrapolative expectations of the chartists, when 
they are initially enjoying the desirable forecasting benefits of 
rational expectations? The rational expectations errors should normally 
be white noise (unless there is a serially correlated exogenous variable 
which affects the exchange rate instantaneously but which cannot be 
observed until after a lag of two or more periods). Either the 
portfolio-managers are irrational or the fundamentalists have got hold 
of the wrong model, in which case they are outside rational 
expectations. The portfolio-managers and the fundamentalists cannot 
both be right. 
The learning process in this model is of the 'appropriate' 
weighting of the two sets of expectations. Yet, if there is access to 
fundamentalist expectations, rational agents would find further learning 
spurious. Rationality would dictate that the fundamentalist 
expectations would perpetually be given a unit weight. The bub~le 
derives from a consideration of chartist expectations, which arguably 
suggests that the portfolio-managers are not fully exploiting the 
information which is available, which would deliver rational 
expectations. 
The stance of this chapter is to maintain the assumption of 
individual optimality and to avoid ad hoc C0nstru~ts which cannot h~ 
justified by our understanding of the present body of theory. Models of 
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non-rational bubbles may rest on the denial that information is fully 
exploited. Agents in asset markets may have much at stake and should 
therefore not systematically conform to forecasting rules. which would 
prove themselves to be sub-optimal. So if agents cannot form rational 
expectations, they will at least try to form rational expectations by 
endeavouring to learn the model. This position represents a state where 
information is in limited availability and one where any increment is 
fully exploited. 
3.4 The Model 
The model is a special case of the one in Chapter 2. There is 
perfect capital mobility, as there defined, and uncovered interest rate 
parity. A modification here is that it is in the level, not in the 
first difference, of the expected relative yield on a currency, which 
determines the exchange rate. The expected relative yield comprises the 
expected interest rate differential plus the expected rate of 
appreciation. 
In Chapter 2 the exchange rate is modelled as a total balance of 
payments equilibrium and it is demonstrated that there is a convergent 
learning process towards a unique and stationary long-run real exchange 
rate equilibrium. This is consistent with the discussion in Section 3.2 
of this chapter, which permits us to impose a unique and statiol1ary 
solution on the model, precluding a bubble. 
model is obtained by imposing the T('I!!nwing restr:ct::":ns 
BO - 0 
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on equation (1) which gives the model inside full rational expectations 
as 
c - [8/(1 - 8)] vt-l (6) 
This formulation of the model presupposes that agents already know 
the values of the parameters, c and 8. We assume that they do in fact 
-know the value of c, but not of O. The latter represents the 
persistence of real interest rate differentials. So, to the extent that 
real interest rates are determined by the fiscal-monetary policy mix, 6 
represents the persistence of the mismatch between the stabilisation 
policies of the two countries. 
It is clear that a mismatch of any persistence will drive a wedge 
between the current exchange rate and the long-run equilibrium exchange 
rate. A basic prediction of this model is that if agents are able to 
form expectations of the long-run equilibrium, as was argued in Chapter 
2, any misalignment in the real exchange rate will be due to 
expectations of divergent real interest rates. This holds whether or 
not expectations are fully rational in the sense that agents know the 
parameter values of the model. 
It is the main contribution of this paper to consider the case 
outside strong-form rational expectations where agents form expectations 
which are based on incorrect beliefs on the parameter values and where 
these beliefs are under revision. Expectations are still consistent in 
the sense in that they remain faithful to the structural form of the 
model. So, we consider a more general form of equation (6): 
c t c - Gmt_l [8/(1 - 8)] vt-l (7) 
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Agents will make expectations errors where the value of 8 is 
unknown, where generally 8 ~ Gmt_l 8. The latter is defined as market 
beliefs on 8. We define Zt as the relative yield between the two 
assets, comprising the interest rate differential, v t ' less the rate of 
depreciation 
(8) 
Using Gmt_l 0 with equations (2) and (7), we get the following 
expectations made at time t-l for the exchange rate at times t and t+l 
and for the interest rate differental at time t as 
Gmt_l c t c - Gmt_l (8/(1 - 8)] vt_l (9) 
Gmt_l ct+l c - Gmt_l [8 2/(1 - 8)] vt-l (10) 
Gmt_l v t Gmt_l 8 vt-l (11) 
Combining these expectations in the form for z in equation (8), we get 
expected (uncovered) interest rate parity. The expected rate of 
depreciation just equals the expected interest rate differential. 
o (12) 
This obtains because of the extreme case of perfect capital mobility 
(here considered as an approximation), which is defined by the 
restrictions that the values of the parameters 02 and 03 are unbounded. 
Expected interest rate parity is required to ensure the existence of a 
finite equilibrium. 
The actual values for the variables which are determined by the 
expectations above are 
c Gmt_l [8/(1 - 8 ) ] vt-l r' "'\ c t - \.J...J/ 
ct+l c - Gmt [8/(1 - 8 ) ] (8vt _l + wt ) ( 1 I. ) ,-~ 
B \T _ + (.r..lt 
(1 c; , 
v~ '\. .'-
L 'L-l 
Beliefs also determine actual outcomes, but in conjunction with 
the actual values of the parameters. Beliefs on the value of ° will 
generally change between times t-l and t from Gmt _1° to GmtO. We define 
e t Gmt [0 / ( 1 - 0)] - Gmt _ 1 [ ° / ( 1 - 0)] ( 16 ) 
and so, the expectation error is 
Zt - Gmt_l Zt Zt 
(1 - 8) [ (1 + Et ) [ 
+ [ 1 + Gmt _ 1 [ ° 
1 - ° 
(17) 
Ex poste agents will realise expectations errors, as there will 
be mistaken beliefs, an unpredictable noise in the interest rate 
differential and an unpredictable adjustment of beliefs between times 
t-l and t. Assuming that agents know the process for the revision of 
beliefs, there remains an incentive to learn the value of the parameter, 
0, in order to reduce the size of expectations errors. 
3.5 Learning 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Outside REE, agents' forecasts will be biased and withou~ the 
desired property of minimum error variance. There is therefore an 
incentive to learn the unknown values of any parameters, wherever the 
costs of learning are expected to be relatively small, in order to reach 
optimal rational expe~tations forecasts. 
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Learning models [reviewed by Blume, Bray and Easley (1982)] can be 
classical or use Bayesian methods. We look at a Bayesian learning 
process, which offers two advantages. One is that the agents can easily 
revise their beliefs at the realisation of each data point. Secondly, 
there is a role for prior information and subjective beliefs, which may 
be given an economic interpretation. 
In a Bayesian framework all u~certainty can be represented by 
probability distributions. A prior distribution may be assigned to an 
unknown parameter value, which is then subsequently revised in the light 
of the observations generated from its true distribution. The process 
of revision is the process of convergent learning through which the 
subjective priors and posterior distributions evolve over time into the 
true distribution. 
The moments of concern are the mean and the precision, the inverse 
of the variance of a normal distribution. The assumption is of 
normality. A prior mean and precision are assigned to the unknown 
parameter value. The prior mean reflects initial and subjective beliefs 
and the prior precision reflects the confidence with which these beliefs 
are held. The optimality of the statistical process ensures that the 
posterior means evolve into the true value in the light of the 
observations generated. And the posterior precisions increase over time 
which reflects the diminishing of subjective uncertainty over the 
learning process. 
Finally, mention should be made of consistent learning as Q5ain~t 
inconsistent learning. In inconsistent le~rning agen~~ de not take 
account the effects of the dynamics caused by the learning process 
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itself on the model they are trying to learn. Learning becomes 
inconsistent where agents' beliefs affect the model and where agents do 
not realise this. Consistent learning in the view of Bray and Savin 
(1986) and of Townsend (1983) requires strong informational assumptions 
at the outset. Agents must know how other agents are revising their 
beliefs and know how other agents believe others are revising their 
beliefs. Consistent learning must meet the problem of the infinite 
regress in learning. Inconsistent learning may be a more realistic 
assumption outside a REE and one which does not beg the informational 
questions. 2 
3.5.2 Application to Hodel 
Initially there is a REE where agents know all the parameters of 
equation (6). There is then a policy change which leads to a new value 
for O. We assume that agents know the long-run equilibrium, c, but do 
not know the new value for O. 
We assume that agents are completely homogeneous in beliefs and 
expectations. They all have the same prior beliefs and all believe that 
they do. Complete homogeneity is just one solution to the infinite 
regress in beliefs and expectations [Phelps (1983)], Furthermore. we 
assume that they all observe the same relevant variables and that they 
all know that they observe the same: they have common knowledge. 
This simplifies the model, reducing it to one driven by a single 
representative agent. It overlooks the problem of agents learning about 
the beliefs of each other, about subjective factors. The model i:; rm 
fAr- wit-h those in the earlier learning literature of r.ver ~: J 
2 A fuller consideration of these themes is given in Chapter 4. 
(1974), Decanio (1979) and Friedman (1979). In models without the need 
to solve, the infinite regress, convergence to REE is not problematical, 
given a reasonably stable parameterisation of the underlying structure. 
We refer to the cobweb learning models of Cyert and DeGroot (1974), 
Decanio (1979) and Bray and Savin (1986). 
The state we describe, although outside REE, contains strong 
informational assumptions, so that convergence to REE is not surprising. 
The purpose, however, is not to give an example of stable learning but 
to depict a pattern of exchange rate dynamics. The dynamics are 
attributed to the learning process and not to the presence of bubbles. 
We contend that a marginal weakening of the strong information 
availability assumptions of the rational expectations hypothesis (REH) 
can given rise to phenomena which are otherwise attributed to bubbles. 
The combination of perfect substitutability (risk-neutrality) and 
homogeneous expectations can give the odd result that everyone believes 
asset x to offer a higher return than y, so that the aggregate demand 
for y is zero. This does not apply here, for the model is constructed 
such that the expected interest differential on the asset denominated in 
the domestic currency is equal to the expected rate of (domestic 
currency) depreciation. The two assets offer the same expected return. 
This means that the asset demand functions are indeterminate, but this 
causes no problems as the exchange rate is fully determinate. 
As agents know c we set its value at zero, so the current value of 
the exchange rate is equal to its undervaluation. Instead of equation 
(!3), we use 
-G t - l (8L/1-8L) v t -1 (18) 
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with 
(15) 
, 
8L is the long-run value of 8, which is employed to allow perfect 
persistence in the short-run (8 = 1), which would not be admissable in 
the long-run (8L < 1). 
The exchange rate is determined by aggregate beliefs on 8L the 
long-~Jn value of 8, and by the nominal interest rate differential. Its 
dynamics derive from the dynamics of the latter in (15) and from the 
learning process described below. 
Learning is the adjustment of beliefs. As there is complete 
homogeneity of beliefs on 8L, there is no requirement for agents to 
learn aggregate beliefs or market opinion. The problem is reduced to 
that of a single agent. We assume that the single agent and all agents 
obtain information on 8L from learning about 8 in equation (15). 
In the first set of simulations 8L and 8 are the same. That is to 
say the policy change is permanent and that 8 is less than one for 
determinacy. The value of 8 is determined by objective government 
policy but beliefs on 8L are conditional on subjective factors durine 
the learning process. 
At time 0 there is a policy change and a new valu6 for 8. At that 
time when the change is made agents are aware of the change but not of 
the new value. They have beliefs on the normal distribution of Y. 
is believed to be distributed with mean, mO' anc precision, hO' th8 
past values of the interest differential, v_l' v_2' v_3' ... At time 1 
agents observe the interest differential, va' an additional observation 
generate~ by the new value of 8. They may revise their priors (Cyert 
and DeGroot (1974)] according to 
(hO mO + q va V_l) (hO + q v_12)-1 
hO + q v_12 
(19) 
(20) 
hO represents the initial degree of confidence with which the belief, 
rna, is held as the inverse of its subjective variance. In the limiting 
case of perfect confidence, beliefs do not change: ml is ~qual to rna 
where hO is infinite. If there is either no confidence in the belief, 
mo or no noise in the interest rate differential (an infinite value for 
q), then beliefs converge immediately to vO/v_l' 
And (19) and (20) may be written as 
(ht-l/q) mt-l + vt-l v t -2] (ht/q)-l 
t-2 
hO/q + L 
i=O 
(21) 
(22) 
For non-zero and finite values for the initial precision, hO' and for 
the interest ~ate differential noise precision, q, beliefs on 8 should 
converge asymptotically to its true value. 
The simplified information structure, effectively of a single 
agent, allows for rational or consistent learning. The learning does 
not affect the part of the model being learned, which is external to the 
learning process. 
3.5.3 Simulations 
We start from a position of REE with a 8 value of 0.25. The mean 
of the interest rate differential is zero, so thaL the mean of the 
exchange rate is zero and is in long-run equilibrium. At time 0 th~~~ 
is a policy change. The value of 8 is raised from 0.25 to 0.80 and the 
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interest rate differential on the domestic currency is set at 3%. 
Although noise in the interest rate differential is necessary to gradual 
learning, it is removed from most of the simulations to give an 
underlying picture. The interest rate differential in each succeeding 
period will be 0.80 of its value in the preceding period. If agents 
remain in a state of perpetual REE without learning, the exchange rate 
would appreciate by 12% concurrently with the realisation of the policy 
change [see equation (18)]. The appreciation would be an instantaneous 
jump to be followed by a gradual convergence to the long-run equilibrium 
value at the same rate as the rate of convergence of the interest rate 
differential to zero. The dynamic pattern would not be dissimilar to 
the one in the Dornbusch (1976) overshooting model. 
Outside REE and with learning, the process is different and takes 
on a more cyclical appearance, because of the gradual adjustment of 
beliefs. Figure 1 shows the pattern. [See page 104.] 
The initial value for e is 0.25, so the prior belief, mO, should 
also be 0.25. We first consider the case where the precision ratio, the 
ratio of the prior belief precision, hO, to the noise precision, q, is 
20. This gives the exchange rate 'overvaluation' path of x(A) in Fi.gure 
l. 
Following the policy change, agents observe the interest 
differential of 3%. There is as yet not enough information to adjust 
their belief in the value of 0.25. But at time 1 the rise in the 
interest differential itself is enough to cause an appreciation of 1% 
(3%(0.25)/(1-0.25)). 
Y6 
In period 2 agents observe enough information to adjust their 
prior beliefs. With a prior precision ratio of 20, the belief of 0.25 
is adjusted upwards to 0.421, closer to the real value of 0.8. This 
causes a further appreciation of 0.75% in period 2. In period 3 the 
appreciation is only 0.05% and thereafter the exchange rate depreciates, 
returning to a value of 0.16% by period 15. 
The patte~~ is of a gradual rise and then an even more gradual 
decline in the exchange rate. This cyclical pattern is caused by the 
interaction of policy and of learning. In the early stages the exchange 
rate appreciates because agents are learning quickly in relation to the 
rate of decline of the interest rate differential. The belief in the 
value of 0/(1-0) is increasing at a rate which is larger than 1/0. Then 
the exchange rate begins its decline when the rate of fall in the 
interest rate differential exceeds the rate of revision in beliefs. The 
fall in the interest rate differential itself slows the learning process 
because its decreasing numerical magnitude reduces its effectiveness as 
a signal. Beliefs of the value of 0 get stuck at round about 0.555 by 
period 12. 
Referring also to Figure 1, x(B) gives the exchange rate 
'overva1uation path' where the initial precision ratio is lower, at 6. 
If we assume that there is the same degree (although removed for the 
simulations) of noise in the interest rate differential, the lower ratio 
reflects less confidence in prior beliefs. The effect is for the 
exchange rate climb to be ~teeper. It is overvalued by 3.42% in period 
3 compared with an overvaluation 0: 1.80% in the previous example. It 
too hpgins its descent at this point, but the fall is steeper because it 
is further away from its long-run equilibrium. 
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The initial cl~mb is steeper because there is less confidence in 
the initial value of 0.25 and so more confidence in learning the true 
value of e from the basis of the data the model generates. Beliefs on e 
get stuck too near period 12, but at the higher value of 0.693 because 
of the initial boost. In this second case the exchange rate is always 
more overvalued than in the first case, because with less confidence in 
the old "'Talue of 0.25 agents approach the new REE more quickly. In the 
limiting case of a zero precision ratio, there is an equivalence to a 
perpetual state of REE. 
In the remaining examples we consider where Band BL do not 
coincide. Policy determining the value of e can be reversed, so that it 
is not a long-run parameter. But the parameter which is germane to 
expectations is BL. We allow for feedback from 8 to 8L since in 
principle eL can be regarded as an average of a series of short-run B. 
As before, we start from a REE where the values of G and eL are 
0.25. This time, however, the value of e is raised to 1 in period 0 and 
the policy is reversed in period 8. Agents, who perceive that the 
policy will eventually be reversed, will hold beliefs on the value of &L 
between 0.25 and 1. This also ensures the determinancy of the exchange 
rate. 
A new interpretation can be given to the role of the prior 
precision in the learning process when B is 1. A high value for the 
prior precision, a great weight on the prior value of e, which is less 
h • d· h h , . . t __ an one, 1n 1cat:es t:. ,at t e po .... l.cy l.S reg3rded as being shert-lived. 
Beliefs on 8L will fall well short of 1. Alternatively, a low value for' 
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the prior precision, indicates that the policy is regarded as being 
long-lived then beliefs on the value of BL may approach unity. 
The learning problem is more difficult since agents may not be 
able to learn the permanence of the new policy. The Bc;.yesian prior will 
reflect their unsubstantiable beliefs of the policy's permanence. 
In period 0 the interest differential is set at 3%, and as B is 
set at unity, the policy represents a relative monetary contraction of 
some persistence in the domestic economy. 
Figure 2 [on page 105] shows the case where there is an initial 
precision ratio of 20. In period 1 the exchange rate appreciates by 1%. 
Thereafter it continues appreciating at a constant rate of 1.80% until 
the policy reversal is perceived, reaching a level of LS.40% by period 
9. The conti.nued appreciation derives from the persistence of the 
positive interest rate differential and from increasing beliefs of the 
permanence of the policy. 
At period 10 enough information of the policy reversal is 
received, so that the exchange rate devalues by 12.67%, falling to 
2.73%. This hard-landing is followed by a gradual decline over the 
following periods, with the exchange rate falling as the interest rate 
diffe~enti~l falls to zero. 
In Figure 2 we also show the dynamics where the precision prior lS 
reduced from the value of 20 above to 12. The effpct is to increasE' tbe 
amplitude of the 'cycle'. After thp. first appreciation of 1%, there is 
a constant rate of appreciation of 3% during the implementation of t.hE' 
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policy. The overvaluation by period 9 is 25% and the hard-landing in 
period 10 is even harder with a fall of 21.31% to 3.69%. The landing is 
. 
harder, the more agents believe in the persistence of a situation which 
is eventually going to prove transitory. 
Figure 3 [on page 106] shows that the landing is also harder if 
agents revise their precision belief on perceiving the policy reversal. 
tarting with a precision of 20, it climbs to 92 by period 9. This 
represents the confidence with which agents hold beliefs on the unknown 
value of O. In period 9 when the policy change is perceived, there is 
then no reason for beliefs to be held with the same degree of 
confidence. The precision ratio is restored to its original value. 
Consequently the exchange rate falls to 1.42% as compared with the 2.73% 
it would falls to without a revision of the precision ratio. 
Figure 4 [on page 107] shows the case where there is no sudden but 
a gradual reversal in policy. Instead of an immediate transition of the 
value of 8 from 1 to 0.25, it is reduced over 8 periods. The exchange 
rate decline is gradual with an average fall of account 2.5% per period. 
A soft-landing scenario is depicted. 
Finally, Figure 5 [on page 108] gives the case shown in Figure 2 
without the exclusion of the interest rate differential noise. 
Unsurprisingly, the path of appreciation and depreciation are less 
smooth. But what is of note is that the variance of the exchange rate 
is greater at the end than at the outset. The reason is that beliefs on 
the value of 0, following the policy reversal, do not fall as low uS the 
ori.slnal 0.25 hut fall from a high of 0.84 to "'lbotlt 0.78. The fall is 
slight because when the interest rate differential becomes small, there 
is little variation in the data on which agents could revise their 
beliefs. At the end, exchange rate variation is 10.6 times higher 
[0.78/(1-0.78)] [(1-0.25)/(0.25)]. Despite the reversal of the policy, 
the reduction of 8 to 0.25, and a zero mean differential, the legacy is 
of greater exchange rate variance. 
3.5.4 Hard-landing vs. Soft-landing Scenarios 
Mention has been given to the prospect of a ha~d-landing as 
against a soft-landing in the exchange rate following a policy reversal. 
We found three factors making for a hard-landing. 
(i) Agents believe in the permanence of a temporary policy, so 
that the exchange rate overreacts to a policy change in the short-
run only to adjust dramatically at the perception of the policy 
reversal. 
(ii) On perception of the reversal, agents suddenly revise their 
beliefs. 
(iii) The reversal of policy is sudden rather than gradual. 
In 1985 there was a consensus that the dollar was overvalued. The 
discussion was largely over whether there would be a hard-landing or a 
soft-landing. Frankel (1985) estimated the overvaluation to be 29%. In 
terms of our model this overvaluation can be explained by the existence 
of a positive interest rate differential on dollar assets and a belief 
in ~he persistence of the US policy of a relative monetary deflation. 
The latter is justified by the experience of a positive differential 
favouring the dollar throughout the 1980s. Marris (1985) believed the 
dollar would crash down when its time to fall eventually came. 
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Between August 1985 and March 1986 there was no perceivable change 
in the interest rate differential on US and German funds. Yet over the 
same time there was a gradual depreciation of 21%. This suggests that 
there was a gradual perception that policy would change. Part of this 
may have been anticipatory, but part was probably adaptive because over. 
the period the differential rose from 2.91 to 3.37 before falling to 
2.94. 3 
Over the next six months the differential fell from 2.94 to 1.35. 
And over the same period from March to September the dollar-DM exchange 
rate fell by 10%. The bulk of the fall within this period (8%) came in 
July and August. In these two months there was a sudden fall in the 
differential from 2.32 to 1.32. So at least some of the evidence points 
to the role of the smoothness of a policy transition in influencing the 
adjustment rate of a perceptively overvalued currency. 
3.6 Summary 
It has been argued that the empirical failure of fundamental 
models of the exchange rate cannot be remedied by minor modifications of 
their underlying assumptions. This seems to leave three alternatives: 
the existence of rational bubbles, irrational bubbles or of learning. 
We have made a theoretical case against the first two in favour of 
learning. Learning at least maintains the information-exploitation 
assumption. 
3 The differential is the rate New York Federal Funds minut> tb~ Lute 
on 3-month Frankfurt money market funds (averages for the month) 
obtained from the Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
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The learning model considered is simple with strong information 
availability assumptions, but which are less strong than t~ose of the 
REH. That is to say agents do not need to learn about each others' 
beliefs, about market opinion, as we assume complete homogeneity. The 
only uncertainty is of goverp~ent policy. Despite this, there is 
considerable mileage gained from the modified information availability 
assumption. 
The model is able to explain exchange rate cycles of varying 
amplitude, slow and fast climbs from long-run equilibrium and hard- and 
soft-landings back to it. The Bayesian learning process, allowing for 
subjective factors, agents' beliefs, are central to this analysis of 
exchange rate dynamics. In particular, it is shown that a change to a 
policy which is unsustainable in the long-run (with perfectly persistent 
interest rate differentials) will have less effect in the short-run if 
agents have relative confidence in the previous (sustainable) policy. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SUBJECTIVE BELIEFS AND THE REGRESS IN BELIEFS: 
SOME CONSIDERATIONS 
SYNOPSIS 
Convergent learning by agents towards rational expectations 
equilibrium (REE) is interpreted as a test of the stability of that 
equilibrium. We, like others, suggest that learning must necessarily 
take an unsophisticated form, because of limitations to the availability 
of information and of costs in acquiring information, not least when 
consideration is given to the problems of coordinating the revision of 
beliefs in a decentralised market. 
Examples of consistent and of inconsistent learning are considered 
in an asset market model of the exchange rate where the focus is on 
expectations of others' expectations. We find that there is no stable 
REE with perfect capital mobility by the criterion of the learning 
processes considered. This implies direct current account effects on 
the exchange rate according to the analysis of Chapter 2. We also find, 
there, that because of high capital mobility, the stability of any 
equilibrium requires that the exchange rate at least approximates a 
random walk in this specification of the model. 
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4.1 Pre1iminarJ Discussion and Introduction 
This chapter relates three areas of theory to propose that 
economic activity within asset markets may in part be stylized by 
processes of learning. These areas are efficient markets theory, the 
theory of learning towards rational expectations equilibrium (REE) and 
Keynes' (1936) analysis of the role of beliefs on subjeccive factors in 
asset price determination. The discussion of this paper is applied to a 
model of the exchange rate, but, of course, the implications are wider. 
The efficient markets theory literature [reviewed by Andersen 
(1982)] considers the conditions under which market price can convey 
information between different groups of traders or agents. If market 
price is fully-revealing, in aggregating and disseminating the 
information of all agents, then the sufficiency of price deters the 
costly pursuit of private information. 
The context of the efficient markets literature is one of rational 
expectations, but one necessarily without homogeneous beliefs and 
expectations. Indeed, it is proposed, by Strong and Walker (1987), that 
the notion of a REE is the one which is applicable where price is seen 
to convey information in an environment of heterogeneity. It is worth 
noting that this microeconomic definition of rational expectations is 
fundamentally different from the one used in the mac~oeconomic 
literature, where, by cornmon knowledge of the resul~ of the general 
application of a standard solution algorithm, everyone forms the same 
expectation [as in Lucas and Prescott (1971)]. Homogeneous expectations 
may be regarded as a characterisation of the limiting case of the 
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microeconomic rational expectations notion where price is fully-
revealing. 
If the price system is sufficient to aggregate and to disseminate 
all the relevant information of the market, t~en agents will have no 
incentive to seek additional sources of information. A basic conclusion 
from Grossman (1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1976 and 1980) is that 
information costs would preclude the informational sufficiency of 
prices. Strong-form informational efficiency as defined by Fama (1970) 
will not hold. 1 
Information costs in weakening the price-signalling mechanism may 
give scope for agents to seek private sources of information, which have 
not become socially aggregated in prices. Competitive market activity 
may thus more appropriately be characterised in terms of information 
search rather than by notions of strong-form informational efficiency. 
There is here some relationship to the second area of theory, of 
learning towards REE [reviewed by Blume, Bray and Easley (1982)]. 
Agents try to learn the initially unknown parameter values of the model 
in the hope of forming optimal forecasts with the properties of 
unbiasedness and minimum mean square error. They revise their prior 
beliefs in the light of observed data, which have been generated by the 
~odel. If learning is successful, they will converge to rational 
expectations, and successful learning is interpret~d as the stability of 
REE. 
1 
The operational use of REE way be justified hy appealing to 
Fama's definition requires that no individuals 'have monopolisLic 
.':!ccess to any information rclev.::nt fer price forrr..:lt:ic-~', so th3::-
no subset of th~ market is at an informational advcGltage (or 
disadvantage) . 
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convergent learning. Convergent learning may lead to a strong-form of 
REE of homogeneous expectations where all agents observe the same 
signals. Kihlstrom and Mirman (1975) show that ' ... all experienced 
Bayesian market observers have the same expectations'. 
A major issue in the learning literature has been the distinction 
between consistent and inconsistent learning. This is particularly 
relevant to the consideration of the coordination problem in a 
decentralised market of agents with heterogeneous beliefs. Consistent 
learning requires that the learning process has no unanticipated effect 
on the model being learned. This may be either because there is no 
effect, as in economically simplified models, or because the effect can 
be fully anticipated, as in models with strong assumptions on the 
availability of information. The first instance applies in the models 
of Taylor (1975), Friedman (1979) and in Chapter 3. The second instance 
applies to the models of Townsend (1978, 1983A and 1983B). Inconsistent 
learning may induce unanticipated effects, as it is baSed on a 
misspecification. 
Consistent learning may be regarded as an equilibrium in learning 
and as self-fulfilling learning, as there is no incentive to modify 
learning forms and forecast functions. It may therefore be regarded as 
a weak-form of REE, before convergence to the strong-form where beli~fs 
a~e homogeneous. The latter is not problematical, given the 
sophistication of the learning process which takes full account of its 
own dynamics. In this way, consistent learning may be designated self-
fulfilling learning in the same way that rational or model-consistent 
expectations are self-fulfilline· 
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In one sense, consistent learning as a weak-form of REE where 
price is not fully revealing, is strongly analogous to the state of 
agents collecting information in the rational expectations context of 
the efficient markets literature. Convergence would be to a stronger, 
fully-revealing REE. The link between the two areas of theory is made 
by Kihlstrom and Mirman (1975) and by Bray (1982). However, there is 
another sense in which the two areas differ: information costs are 
central to efficient markets theory, but learning costs sre largely 
overlooked in the learning literature. This theme is taken up later. 
Frydman (1982) and 1983) has argued that consistent learning is 
untenable in the context of a decentralised market where the only 
information held is that acquired through the process of learning. 
There is an identification problem for the agent trying to estimate the 
model: it is not possible to separate the effect of fundamental factors 
from the effect of the beliefs of others. The conditions for consistent 
learning in the Townsend (1978, 1983A and 1983B) are quite stringent, 
requiring considerable initial endowments of information. 
Frydman (1983) has also suggested that the alternative of 
inconsistent learning brings the problem that learning forms and 
forecast functions become indeterminate. If agents are learning and 
forecasting inconsistently with the model, there is an incentive for 
individuals to revise their learning forms and forecast functions. Ir 
is only in the limiting case of consistent learning, which is 
implausible anyway, that there is no incentive to further revision. If 
learning cannot feasibly be consistent, and if inconsisten~ , . . ..Learrll.!l6 1S 
dogeed by indeterminacy, the analysis re.e.ches :! st2.1emate 
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The problem may be resolved by admitting costs to learning. In the 
same way that information costs explain the non-existence of strong-form 
informational efficiency and the private gathering of information in the 
efficient markets literature, learning costs should be regarded as 
endemic to the analysis of learning outside and towards strong-forro REF, 
Learning costs may resolve the analytical stalemate mentioned 
above. First, if agents start from a base of inconsistent learning, 
costs give a sufficient reason why agents may not be able to modify 
their learning equations. The limit of full consistency may be 
unreachable. Secondly, learning costs resolve the determinacy problem. 
If there are costs, it is not certain that there are always overwhelming 
incentives to revise inconsistent learning forms. Therefore by widening 
the framework, it can become optimal for agents to use learning forms 
which are not entirely consistent. There is then a determinate 
inconsistent learning equilibrium, where the expected costs to revision 
outweigh the expected gains. An analogy is found in Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1976), who give an informational equilibrium wh2re the 
individual is indifferent to becoming informed. 
Another problem with learning is that if it is successful, it may 
cause convergence to a form of REE which is sufficiently close to the 
strong-form informational equilibrium, which the efficient market 
literature predicts is non-existent. This form of REE is one with 
homogeneous beliefs, which was mentioned with reference to the Kihlstrom 
and Mirman (1975) paper. If all agents observe the same signals, and 
their learning processes are stable, they will surely come to the same 
beliefs. Consequently: learning costs may also be analytically usefu; 
liS 
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to throw some sand into the works in order to prevent a smooth 
transition towards a state of the world, which is implausible. 
Muth (1961), in his seminal statement of rational expectations, 
specified the state where the average of agents' subjective 
distributions of price corresponds with the objective distribution of 
price. There was an allowance for differences of belief across agents. 
But a stronger version has since emerged in the macroeconomic literature 
where the subjective price distribution of each agent corresponds with 
the objective price distribution - as in Lucas and Prescott (1971). The 
latter of a homogeneous REE would seem to be supported by appealing to 
learning of the type in Kihlstrom and Mirman (1975). Therefore if the 
operational use of REE is to be justified by appealing to successful 
learning, it may be the one of homogeneous expectations which should be 
used. 
But it seems incongruous to apply the assumption of homogeneous 
expectations to an asset market where a primary reason for trading is 
the difference in beliefs and expectations. This point was well made by 
Grossman (1977) and by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) in the context of an 
asset market inside REE. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) claim that 
'speculative markets where prices reveal a lot of information will be 
very thin because it [competitive equilibrium] will be composed of 
individuals with very similar beliefs' . 
Learning costs may ensure that agents can never learn enough ~o 
undermine the raison d'etre of an asset market, the difference in 
beliefs _ Although convergence is 
possibility, costs can prevent the possibility of learning too much lD 
finite time. Learning costs also overcome the indeterminacy problem 
considered by Frydman (1983), and also allow some reconciliation of 
learning theory with efficient markets literature, which freely admits 
information costs. 
The third area of discussion is Keynes' (1936) analysis of the 
role of market beliefs in asset price determination. Market beliefs 
through their effects on demand determine prices, so that agents have a 
strong incentive to anticipate market beliefs in order to anticipate 
market prices. As their anticipations in aggregate themselves 
constitute market beliefs, the market beliefs of relevance are those on 
a higher order of market beliefs. Logically, there is an infinite 
regress in market beliefs because of their recursive determination. 
Keynes' metaphor for this state was the 'beauty contest'. Such contests 
in the newspapers of the 1930s were about most correctly anticipating 
the opinion of the masses who entered rather than picking the most 
beautiful faces, 
Consequently, learning or the acquisition of information will be 
of market beliefs, which are germane to price determination. Agents 
may, in some circumstances, have little incentive to learn the object:ivp 
parameter values of a model which is outside REE. The incentive will be 
to learn market beliefs and subjective as well as objective factors. 
The foregoing discussion hopes to establish the proposition that ~ 
model of learning in a decentralised market will plausibly take an 
unsophisticated form. Another propositicn is that agents will endeavour 
prices. This paper establishes an exchange r~te model under leal:ning. 
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In one example, we present a self-fulfilling learning strategy where 
market beliefs are learned. This is based on rather strong ,assumptions. 
Another example is where agents try inconsistently to learn the REE. 
Learning is inconsistent because of implicit costs, not drawn out in the 
technical discussion which follows. There is inconsistency because each 
agent is revising an individual belief on market opinion, which is 
specified as a constant, but market opinion is defined as the 
aggregation of individual beliefs which are non-constant during the 
process of revision under learning. 
The purpose of the paper is to extend the analysis of exchange 
rate dynamics, considered in Chapters 2 and 3. The perspective here is 
on the interaction of many agents with heterogeneous beliefs learning 
about subjective factors, average or market beliefs. Questions arise 
which have no relevance to the homogeneous information case. Some of 
the issues from the literature on multiagent learning are explored. We 
are indebted particularly to the forementioned analyses of Townsend 
(1978, 1983A and 1983B) and of Frydman (1982 and 1983). 
Section 4.2 establishes the basic model of the exchange rate for 
consideration with the assumption of risk-neutrality. It is closp.ly 
related to the one given in Chapter 2. The exchange rate is determined 
by the condition of equilibrium on the total balance of payments, 
comprising the capital account and the current account. With respect LU 
the capital account, the simplification of risk-neutrality allows us to 
overlook the expected variances of asset yields as arguments in the 
asset demand functions. Agents are concerned with the rela~ive means of 
the two a~sets in the model, 
domestic currency, the other in terms of the foreign currency. 
Section 4.3 looks at the REE solution to the model. It is derived 
from the undetermined coefficients algorithm which delivers a 
homogeneous expectations solution with common knowledge on the parameter 
values. We suggest that the application of this solution method, which 
implicitly requires an omniscient individual to apply it, is 
inappropriate to a decentralised market where agents cannot coordinate 
their beliefs. This statement was argued by Phelps (1983) and by 
Frydman (1983). The REE solution serves, however, as an interesting 
benchmark case. 
Section 4.4 considers the more general case. Subjective factors 
are very important as agents' beliefs determine market outcomes. It is 
not only necessary for agents to form beliefs, but for them to form 
beliefs on others' beliefs and on beliefs of ever increasing order as in 
Keynes (1936). The problem of the infinite regress in beliefs and 
expectations is irrelevant outside strong-form REE, where agents are 
concerned with subjective factors (which Keynes called 'speculation') 
and not with the objective factors (which he called 'enterprise'). We 
reach a strong conclusion, because of the atomistic nature of agents, 
that if agents believe that the market is outside REE, they will see 
little incentive to solve or to learn only objective parameter values 
alone of the model. They see every incentive to determine the 
subjective beliefs of others, which will determine market outcomes. 
The existence of an equilibrium apart from REE requires that the 
market believes that there are some restrictions on the p~rameteris~tion 
of the seL of higher orden~d f,ial-ket h*"lief~ in the infinite !"':?g!::,::,~s. I!! 
'-' 
the extreme case of perfect capital mobility with potentially unbounded 
capital flows, determinacy is given only where agents believe that there 
is REE. This belief will be self-fulfilling and ensure an equilbrium 
with uncovered interest parity. This equilibrium is only guaranteed 
inside REE. 
Outside REE, we consider the possibility that agents individually 
endeavour to learn the model. Section 4.5 considers consistent and 
inconsistent learning in a discursive fashion. Consistency in learning 
exists where the learning process itself has no unanticipated effect on 
the model being learned. It requires strong informational assumptions 
at the outset to enable agents to foresee the effects of their 
collective actions on the model. Frydman (1982 and 1983) has shown that 
consistent, or rational, learning is untenable with respect to a 
decentralised market where the only information which can be held is 
that acquired through the learning process. We could cite learning 
costs as a sufficient reason for the untenability. 
Section 4.6 considers applications of consistent and of 
inconsistent learning to the general model of the exchange rate. 
Learning generally is treated in a purely econometric fahion, as if 
agents were 'superior statisticians' to quote Arrow (1978). In this 
section we consider a form of social learning where agents canvass each 
other's beliefs to determine the mood of the market. It is apparent 
that organised market institutions like the stock exchange and the 
foreign currency exchanges give scope for agents to interact in a ~ocial 
framework. It is an important consi.deration in the context of the 
heterogeneity of beliefs and the effect of beliefs on market outcomes. 
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With reference to statistical learning forms, instability is a 
real possibility in the case of inconsistent learning. There agents 
have not the information required to take into account the effect of 
their learning on the model. The boundary between stability and 
instability is determined by the parameterisization of the underlying 
model. The parameter representing holdings of wealth and the ease with 
which agents can borrow for risk-neutral speculation must be relatively 
low to ensure stability. It is found that there is some correspondence 
between the existence of a finite equilibrium exchange rate outside REE 
and on the asymptotic stability of inconsistent learning. 
There are two conclusions from the model which have some relevance 
to an understanding of the exchange rate. There is no stable REE where 
capital mobility is unbounded, if the stability test is the inconsistent 
learning process which we give. By this criterian, we could not jusLify 
a REE with exact uncovered interest rate parity. Determinacy in this 
case requires bounded capital mobility as a minim~~ condi~ion. 
Secondly, if capital mobility is bounded but high, the stability of REE 
in this model would then require that the interest rate differential at 
least approximates a random walk. The corresponding REE would be one 
where the exchange rate follows a random walk (which has some empirical 
significance). 
Section 4.7 briefly widens the area of discussion by considering 
three issues of importance to learning. These are the individual e.,," 
ante optimality of inconsistent learning in a decentralised market, 
which may lead to an externality; the determinacy of inconsistent 
leart'.i!lQ: and forecasting where learninll costs a.re consid-=red;:p'0- ."'! 
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separate wealth dynamics, which has been considered in the efficip.nt 
markets literature. 
There are two issues, which we consider of relevance to the 
learning of rational expectations. One is that the analysis can benefit 
greatly from considerations which have arisen in the efficient markets 
literature, particularly with respect to learning within an asset 
market. The second is that a learning model can be considered as a 
representation of the process of information acquisition in markets 
where price is not a perfect aggregator and disseminator of information, 
Therefore the notion of homogeneous information REE may have little 
scope, and there may be considerable merit in modelling an asset market 
conjoined with a learning model to describe the dynamic patterns of the 
data. This chapter aims to explore some of these ideas rather than to 
seek some general conclusions. 
4.2 The Model 
The basic model of the exchange rate is considered in this 
section. Considerations are given to the special case of the rational 
expectations equilibrium (REE) solution in the next section and of the 
more general solution in the following section. 
The model is similar to the one in Chapter 2. There the exchange 
rate was determined by a balance o£ payments equilibrium condition, 
giving consideration to the current and the capital account. The lat~er 
was determined by the first difference in the expectatiun of tho me~n 
relative yield between domestic currency denominated and foreign 
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currency denominated assecs. The rationale was that the desired stocks 
of assets were a function of the mean relative yield, and that the 
capital account was treated as the first difference in these stocks. In 
this version, we simplify by assuming that the capital account is 
determined by the level of the expectation of the mean relati~,e yield. 
Again it is assumed that agents are risk-neutral speculators in 
order to avoid considerations of the variances of the asset yield 
distributions, which would complicate the analysis. 
In Chapter 2 the focus was on some informational aspects with 
respect to the current account. This paper, still with a mind to these 
aspects, limits the range of issues by assuming that the current account 
follows a random walk. 
(1) 
(2) 
All variables are in real terms: c is the real exchange rate or 
competitiveness. A rise in c constitutes a real depreciation. The 
variable f represents the current account and follows a random walk. 
The noise term, €, is normally, identically and independently 
distributed. The parameter on the average expectation of the relutive 
mean yield, b, represents the magnitude and speed of capital flows, as 
in Chapter 2. The magnitude will depend on wealth stocks and 
borrc~:ings . We characterise che case of perfect capital mobility 
one where the value of b is unbounded. In this case a solution ic 
-~ -a.s '-lle 
ensured if agents believe that the market is in REE, and so apply a 
racional expectations algorithm to the model. 
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G is the expectations operator and Gi t is agent i's expectatior. at 
time t and the one which exploits all information available at the same 
time. The average expectation across all agents or the market 
expectation is an appropriately weighted average of all individual 
expectations: 
is the mean relative yield at time t+l, so that Gmt_l Zt+l is the 
market expectation made at time t-l of the relative mean yield at time 
t+l. The relative mean yield at time t+l is defined by 
('~ ) 
It comprises the real interest rate differential favouring domestic 
currency denominated (dcd) assets, v t ' minus the rate of real 
depreciation, ct+l - Ct. The latter constitutes a capital gain for 
domestic residents holding foreign currency denominated (fcd) assets and 
a capital loss for foreign residents holding dcd assets. The model is 
completed by specifying the real interest rate differential as a Markov 
process: 
(4) 
A more standard treatment would be to determine the i.nterest rates from 
the conditions of goods market and money market equibria in each 
country. We could make explicit the assumption that the money supplies 
are endogenous and that the interest rates are ~ontrolleble instruments 
of policy. As before, differential relationship for interest ~ates thpD 
suggests that the two countries' monetary authorities are then 
determining a joint policy. Alt~rnatively, we could assume that th~ 
process for the interest rate differential represents ~ reduc9d-form 
which is derived from a two-country policy where money supplies are 
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exogenous and where interest rates are intermediate targets. Either 
way, it is hoped to simplify the structural side of the model. 
The exchange rate at time t is determined by capital movements 
which are based on mean relative yield expectations which are made 
earlier at time t-l. The relevant expectation is of the mean relative 
yield at the future time t+l. which is not observable until that time. 
The model is alternatively represented by 
(5) 
It is of note that the actual exchange rate at time t is no part of the 
expression for the expected mean yield above. If it were then equa1.:ion 
(5) would be equivalent to 
But this case has the unsatisfactory characteristic that information on 
the exchange rate at time t, observed contemporaneously, can be 
exploited to determine the asset demands, which, in turn, determine the 
h h ·· d Th' 1 H ' 1 . , exc ange rate at t e same tLme perLO ,t. 1S re ates to e~ W1g s 
(1982) point that market price cannot plausibly bring both equilibriwn 
and convey information which conditions decisions determining the same 
equilibrium. 
Apart from the exogenous processes determining the current account 
and the interest rate differential, which is an element of the relative 
yield between the two types of asset, the exchange rate is determined by 
market beliefs. A particular solution therefore depends on how mark~t 
beliefs are formed. In the next section we consider the rational 
expectations solution as a special case of market beliefs. 
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4.3 The Rational Expectations Equilibrium Case 
The REE solution of the model is considered as a bencD~ark case. 
Each agent is assumed to form expectations as if the structure of the 
model and its parameter values are fully known. Friedman (1979) 
separates two information assumptions, which are used in the rational 
expectations literature. The information exploitation assumption is a 
statement of individual optimality in the use of information. The 
information availability assumption is one concerning the initial 
endowment of information. 
Defining lit as i's information set at time t and g as the vector 
of parameters on which i would form expectations, the information 
exploitation assumption is 
Gi t g I lit ( .. ), for each i. (h) 
Rationally, agents fully exploit what they have in their information 
sets. 
The information availability assumption of REE requires that 
agents have a generous endowment of information, so that 
lit ( .. ) g, for each i (7) 
Equations (6) and (7) combine to give 
Gi .. g 
L. 
g (8) 
Agents forecast g as if they know g, which in term!; of our model 
includes band O. 
Phelps (1983) and Di Tata (1983) show that the REE notion is even 
more informationally strong when ~ consider~ti'-'n is given !"~~! i -=.t:iod 1y 
to the existence of many agents within a decentralised market. In 
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Townsend's (1978, 1983A and 1983B) terminology, it is not sufficient for 
zero-order beliefs to be correct: that is beliefs on the value of g are 
correct. It is necessary that first-order beliefs are correct: that 
agents correctly perceive that other agents' beliefs on the value of g 
are correct. And, logically, there are second-order beliefs, beliefs on 
beliefs on beliefs on the value of g, and so on. The REE requires a 
solution to the infinite regress in beliefs, considered by Keynes 
(1936), which might be described as a common knowledge of a correct 
informational uniformity. 
The model in effect is reduced to that of a single agent or a 
Hayekian (1948) 'quasi-omniscient individual', who can perform the \pur~ 
logic of choice' in applying a rational expectations equilibrium 
solution method to the general form of the model. The method of 
undetermined coefficients [see Appendix A.4.l] applied to the model 
gives a stationary solution: 
ro 
- f t - bB/[l + bel - 8 ) ] vt-l (9) -t 
as Gmt_l v t Gmt_l 8 vt-l Gi t _l 8 vt_l 8 vt-l from 
equation (14). The solution for the relative yield from equations 
(2)-(4) and (8) is 
8/[1 + bel - 8)] vt-l + (1 + b)/(l + bel - B)] (10) 
And the expected mean of Zt conditional on information at t-l is 
8/[1 + bel - B] vt-l (11) 
Substitution of equation (11), which determines the asset demands i~ the 
general form in equation (1) gives the REE solution in equation (9), 
which demonstrates that rati.onal expectations are self·fulfilling 
expectations. 
There are certain believed empirical regularicies in the exchange 
rate. One is that it follows a random walk, a second is that there is ex 
ante uncovered interest parity (UIP). Within REE as presented by 
equation (9) there are two possibilities of random walk exchange rates 
(as the current account itself follows a random walk): where the value 
of 8 is zero and where the value of 8 is unity with a bounded value for 
b. Outside these two extremes of fully permanent and fully transitory 
interest rate differentials, the exchange rate will not follow a random 
-.valk ins ide REE. 
UIP will only hold if b, the coefficient of capital mobility, is 
unbounded, as shown in equation (11). But if b is unbounded the 
exchange rate is given by 
f t - [8/(1 - 8)] vt-l (12) 
The existence of a finite equilibrium requires that the value of 8 is 
not equal to unity. Therefore within REE the two properties of a random 
walk exchange rate and UIP together require that the value of 8 is zero 
and that b is unbounded. We show later on that this particular REE is 
not stable by the criterion of an inconsistent learning process. 
Therefore the relevance of the assumption of unbounded capital mobility, 
which ensures exact UIP, is to be challenged by a consideration of the 
stability properties of its REE equilibrium. 
Finally, it is often assumed that outside REE agents would learn 
the actual parameter values of the model by running regressions on the 
final form given by equations (4) and (9) to estimate the parameters & 
and b. However, it is shown in the next section that in the general 
cas~ .)f uncoordinated agents wi th di ffp.rp.nt: h~ 1. i~fs r-herp 's li::::le 
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incentive to learn these objective values alone, but every incentive to 
learn the subjective beliefs of other ,agents outside strong-form REE. 
4.4 The General Case 
4.4.1 The Importance of Subjective Factors 
In general agents hold different beliefs while an average of 
agents' beliefs will determine actual market outcomes. Individual 
agents must therefore determine average opinion as a basis on which to 
make portfolio decisions. A distinction is made between objective and 
subjective factors. The value of the parameter, 8, is an objective 
factor, but agents' beliefs on its value are subjective factors. In 
short, agents must determine subjective factors. 
Keynes (1936) found an analogy between asset market behaviour and 
the 'beauty contests' in the newspapers of his day. The winners were 
those who picked the six faces closest to the average choice. So 
objective judgement is not called for, but an anticipation of the 
psychology of the masses. In theory this entails the problem of the 
infinite regress in expectations. To anticipate mass opinion, logically 
it is necessary to anticipate mass opinion of mass opinion. To do the 
latter, it is necessary to take the order of anticipation one stage 
further. The recursive nature of the process leads to the possibility 
of an infinite regress in expectations. This may apply whenever there 
is an element of competition between econo~ic agents and where beliefs 
affect outcomes. Cyert and DeGroot (1970) analysed it within a duopoly 
model. 
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4.4.2 A Representation of the Infinite Regress. 
In section 4.2 some notation for expected variables was introduced. 
In this subsection we aim to complete the notation to give a 
representation of the infinite regress where market beliefs are made on 
higher order market beliefs. 
It was said that Gi t _l Zt+l was the expectation of agent i made at 
time t-l of the value of Zt+l (the mean relative yield) occurring at 
time t+l, and that Gmt_l Zt+l was the corresponding average or market 
expectation, obtained by taking a weighted average across all 
individuals. 
1 (13) 
The expression in equation (13), which is germane to the model, requires 
a recursive solution because it is determined by higher order beliefs. 
Each agent, indexed i, is interested in market beliefs as these 
determine the exchange rate, making the expectation Gi t _l Gmt_l Zt+l' 
This is i's expectation made at time t-l of the contemporaneously made 
market expectation of the mean relative yield at time t+l. Market 
beliefs of market beliefs, or second-order market beliefs, are then 
determined by taking a weighted average: 
~wi - 1 (14) 
Next we determine third-order market beliefs. Agent i makes an 
expectation 2t time t-l of second-c~de~ market beliefs, 
Gi t _l r.mt_l Gmt_l Zt+l' Again by taking a weighted average across ~ll 
the ag~nts, we get 
(15) 
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As all expectations are made contemporaneously (at time t-l), we 
may abbreviate the notation to 
and to 
so that, generally, 
k i 
Gmt_l Gmt_l Zt+p 
for i,k ~ 1, 
k+i 
Gmt_l Zt+p 
p ~ 1 
(16) 
(17) 
In the terminology given by Townsend (1978, 1983A and 1983B), k and i 
signify the order of beliefs. The prospect of the infinite regress in 
beliefs is the consideration that the value of k (or i) is unbounded. 
In the previous section we considered a stong-form REE solution to 
the model, which rests on a correct uniformity in beliefs. This has two 
dimensions: one is that beliefs are identical across agents, the second 
is that each agent projects his belief onto the rest 0f the market. 
These dimensions are respectively: 
Gj t-l Zt+l for each i and j 
for each i and k 
This solution may be regarded as just one out of an infinity 0:: feasib1.c 
solutions. It serves as an interesting benchmark case, but has the 
unappealing characteristic of common knowledge: everyo'2.€ bc1i.c·;23 ::h2 
same and knows it. 
In this section wc consider the general solution outside strung-
form REE. We go on to show that the parameters, band 9, ~rc be}.i~~~d 
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by agents to be not necessarily relevant to their 'calculations', if 
they do not believe themselves to be inside REE. 
The concept to be used is the more general one of 'model-theoretic' 
expectations, as was used by Phelps (1983) in the consideration of a 
similar problem. Model-theoretic expectations are of the family of 
'model-consistent' expectations, but do not require that everyone 
believes that everyone believes the same thing, as in strong-form 
rational expectations as employed in macroeconomics. We use this 
concept along with the multiple regress notation just introduced in the 
immediately preceding paragraphs. 
For what follows, we simplify by assuming that agents believe 
that the market is not revising its beliefs on the value of Zt+l between 
times t-l and t, so 
and that this assumption applies generally for all time periods when 
expectations are made and for all occurrences of z: 
k 
Gi t _1 Gmt +p Zt+q 
k 
Gi t _1 Gmt _1 Zt+q (18) 
for p ~ 0, q ~ 1 
The mean relative yield, z, is of relevance to agents asset lIIarket 
decisions. Therefore expectations will be made of this, and model-
t ' +-' +- t-
0 ns o.T;1' .... "'q··:r,.. co~s;r.:~:"r.·~'J· -,.;:':h the s:ructurCil ferrT, neore_~c expec~a~~o W~LL ~'- ~L ~ U L _____ _ 
for the relative yield. Equations (1)-(3) give the relative yield at 
time t+1 as 
Agent i'~ expectation of the mean of this ;s 
Having derived individual i's expectation of the relative mean 
yield, the market expectation is obtained by averaging across all ~gents 
to get 
This expectation is a part of the expression for the actual relative 
yield in equation (19). Consequently agents must determine this as a 
part of the solution for the relative mean yield. Model-theoretic 
expectations of first-order market beliefs of the mean relative yield at 
time t+l give 
Gimt_l Zt+l Gimt_l f) vt-l + Gimt_l b[Gimt_l Zt+2 - Gimt_l Zt+l] (22) 
and for the same at time t+2 
f)2 2 2 Gimt_l Zt+2 Gimt_l vt-l + Gimt_l b[Gimt_l Zt+3 - Gimt_l Zt+2] (23) 
Substitution of equations (22) and (23) into (20) give 
[Gi t _l f) + Gi t _l b Gimt_l (f)2 - f)] vt-l 
2 
+ Gi t _l b Gimt_l b Gimt_l (Zt+3 - 2Zt+2 + Zt+l) (24) 
Clearly, agent i's expectation of the mean yield is conditional on his 
expectation of market beliefs, market beliefs of the first and second 
orders. A complete solution requires taking the recursion further since 
all orders of market beliefs are conditional on market beliefs of higher 
orders. 
A solution for i's expectation of the mean relative yieid is 
+ Gi t _l b Gimt_l [(e 1) 
.. 
where Gi t _1 Gi t _l 
(; . .. , q v " J 
[ ex) k s k [ ( B l)k 8 ] (Gi t _l b) Z ( 1f Gimt_l b) Gimt _l -k-2 s-l 
And for the market's expeccation of the mean relative yield as 
Gm 1 :": t- .... '"1 
1 
J 
(25) 
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where Gmt_l q 
[
CO k 
Gmt_l 8 + L (~ 
k=l s=l 
s 
Gm t _1 b) Gm t _l [(8 - 1) 8] k+l k  (26) 
Equation (26) is substituted into (1) to get a general expression for 
the exchange rate, which is formally determined in part by a mUltiple 
regress in market beliefs. 
(2"1) 
4.4.3 The Existence of Equilibrium Outside REE 
In the special case of perfect capital mobility as represented by 
an unbounded value for b, equation (27) shows that the existence of an 
equilibrium (with a finite value for the exchange rate) at least 
requires that 
Gmt_l q ~ 0, if b ~ ~ 
This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition, as the rates at 
which the respective terms tend towards their limits is clearly 
important. 
At first hand, it is difficult to see how it could hold, unless 
o for each k 
But this restriction amounts to a trivialising case of the model where 
the interest rate differential is expected by the market at each order 
of beliefs to be zero and therefore not to affect the exchange rate. 
Outside, the trivial case and where there is perfect capital mobility, 
we propose that an equilibrium outside REE cannot exist. 
But a REE does generally exist for perfect capital mcbiJity (see 
Section 4.3) This demonstrates that the rational expectations 
hypothesis is important to the asset market view in ensuring an 
equilibrium for otherwisp. unfavourable parameterisations of cne model, 
nameiy of perfect capit~l mobility_ 
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To depart from the REE paradigm, we assume that capital mobility 
is high but imperfect. This time where b is bounded, existence requires 
a weaker condition that 
I Gmt_l ql < 00 
which is necessary and sufficient. As this may hold fo~ a wide range of 
cases, we consider a further condition which guarantees its sufficiency: 
k-l k k 1 k-l k 2 Gmt_l b Gmt_l [(0 - 1) - OJ < Gmt_l [CO - 1) - OJ, k ~ p 
for some finite value of p, and 
k 
IGmt_l bl < 00 for all k 
This restriction ensures that the infinite regress in market beliefs, 
translated into a recursion of an infinite number of beliefs, sums to a 
finite amount. 
Economic agents of finite intelligence should not be able to 
conceptualise the higher orders of market beliefs. It may be tractable 
to consider market beliefs of the first and second orders, but difficult 
to form an idea of market beliefs of market beliefs of market beliefs. 2 
Even the few chess players who reach the standard of grandmaster cannot 
generally anticipate more than five moves in advance. Therefore we can 
legitimately expect that at a certain order of beliefs an expectational 
blindness besets the economic agent, so that it is not possible to make 
independent expectations for the higher orders of market beliefs. So 
we assume that at a finite order, i, Gmi is approximately equal to 
Gmi+l. Then we can use the more man~geable expression 
k 
Gmt _ 1 [ b (f) - 1) ] I = 0 < 1 for k ~ i (29) 
2 (19 ~6\ h h··'l ;d 'A-d ~h~-~ --~ ~~~-Ke~lncs j /) per .. a.ps, ~~,lwSl.Ca.L. J~' ::;a.L" &.:. '-'CL'::. ::1..L..C ~VJ11~, 
believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees'. 
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If at each order of beliefs the market believes that capital mobility is 
very high, the existence of an equilibrium, which is dependent on the 
. 
state of market beliefs, requires that at each order the market beliefs 
that the interest rate differential follows a random walk. This is 
quite plausible if the short-term value of 0 is being considered, since 
as the time horizon over which agents speculate shortens, agents should 
not expect much change in the interest rate differential. For example, 
if agents are considering hourly changes in market conditions, they 
would normally expect the interest rate differential to be practically 
the same from one hour to another. And if the interest rate 
differential is believed to decline by 40% in magnitude each year, the 
'long-term' annual value of 0 is 0.6. This gives a belief in a weekly 
'short-term' value of 0 of 0.9902 (- 0.61/ 52 ) and so an upper bound of 
102.2 for b which is required for an equilibrium. 
4.5 Consistent and Inconsistent Learning 
Outside REE agents might feel that there are incentives to learn 
the model in improved forecasts. And, agents will see learning as 
feasible, if they believe that the model to be learned has a solution-
Learning contributes a dynamic to the model. Beliefs, which are 
a~ intrinsic part of the model, become non-stationary during the process 
of their revision under learning. This will determine some of the 
. h l' . ld Equatl.·o~ •.s (-1)-(4) and (26) give it variation in t e re atl.ve Yl.e ,Zt' . .-
as 
Zt - [B + h(8 Gmt q - Gmt_l q)] vc-l + (1 + b Gmt q) wt + FtTl 
b ~. ~;ant because, generally, The parameter on vt-l ecomes ~l.me-va~~ , 
Consistent and inconsistent learning are alternative 
possibilities. Learning is consistent where there are no unanticipated 
effects from learning on the model being learned. [See Blume, Bray and 
Easley (1982)] In this event the learning and the forecasts functions 
of agents are consistent with the model, and therefore consistent 
learning may be regarded as self-fulfilling and as a weak-form of REE. 
There is no incentive to revise the learning equations and forecast 
functions. 
Consistent learning requires a great deal of sophistocation on the 
part of agents. Having said this, mention should first be made of a 
trivial case of consistent learning where the model is so constructed as 
to disallow feedback from agents' learning to the model. This applies 
to the models of Taylor (1975), Friedman (1979) and of Chapter 3. 
Despite this, it is more plausible to consider the likely 
generality where there is feedback from learning. Here a great deal of 
sophistocation is usually required of agents. The sophistocation takes 
the form that agents can separately filter the contribution of the 
underlying model and the contribution of other agents revising their 
beliefs on the data observed. It is necessary that agents have 
knowledge of other agents' likelihood functions in order to decypher thE 
effect of their learning on the model. 
It is arguable that this state not only requires agents to act ~s 
if thp.y were 'superior statisticians' to quote Arrow (19 7 8), b'_"!' U!!:il i~ 
also begs the informational questions. A REE containing strong 
137 
138 
assumptions on the availability of information may be juscified on the 
grounds of its stability properties, which are assessed by the 
convergence of learning processes. The assumption of consistency in 
learning, which requires a great availability of information, will 
surely deliver the REE. This is because the availability of information 
assumptions are imposed at the outset, thereby enabling agents to 
achieve the REE, provided that they fully exploit the information which 
they have and in a sufficiently sophistocated fashion. 
In a multi-agent environment the required information for 
consistency is of other agents' likelihood functions. Consequently, the 
question of consistency is problematical in the case of a decentralised 
market of agents with heterogeneous beliefs and expectations. It 
requires that the individual can anticipate how the rest of the market 
is revising its beliefs. 
The scale of the problem is demonstrated by considering the 
infinite regress problems discussed above. Consistency requires that 
individuals account for the effect of the whole market learning on the 
model. As the whole market is composed of the sum of individuals, each 
individual must take account of the whole market accounting for th~ 
effects of the whole market's learning. 
In a heterogeneous information setting consistent learning may be 
interpreted as a particular and informationally strong form of strategy 
within the multiplicity of feasible learning strategies. Tow~send 
(1978, 1983A and 1983B) proposes the notion of a Nash equilibrium in 
learning to ensure that 
whole model. 
In the~e examples, there are strong assumptions concerning the 
initial availability of information. Agents know the (common) Bayesian 
priors of all agents and they know the objective parameter values of the 
model. The dimension of the learning problem is restricted to solving 
the evolving beliefs of others from a foundation of common knowledge at 
the base period. 
And in these examples, agents only need to learn subjective 
factors, they know the objective parameter values of the model. This is 
in contrast with the trivial cases of consistent learning cited, where 
agents only learn the objective parameter values, because there is no 
significance for market beliefs in the model. In simplified models with 
the assumption of continual common knowledge, consistent learning should 
Hot necessarily be problematical because agents do not have to solve 
simultaneously the evolving beliefs of others. 
A point tha~ agents cannot learn objective parameter values and 
subjective beliefs simultaneously was made by Frydman (1982 and 1983). 
Frydman's approach differs from Townsend's in that the only information 
with which agents can be endowed is that which could be acquired during 
the learning process. Agents have no knowledge of the likelihood 
functions which would enable them to filter the effects of the model 
from the effect of agents's learning. 
As it is implicitly as~urned that there is no prior knowledge of 
likelihood functions across the market, there is, in econometric terms, 
an identifi cation problo=!m in separating out the o=>ffecl of th~ o"!lof.1.:>1 f!.',.·d. 
the effect of learning. And in terms of the efficient markets 
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literature, the signal received is noisy because of the effects cf the 
revision of beliefs. The information received is contaminated by noise 
from the rest of the market learning. 
The implausibility of consistency leaves inconsistent learning as 
the alternative. Learning will then have unanticipated effects on the 
model being learned. An example of this is given by Cyert and DeGroot 
(1974) and by Bray and Savin (1986) where agents are learning a form of 
the model which is only correct inside the limit of REE, but incorrect 
outside during the learning process. In terms of our model agents are 
endeavouring to learn the form of the relative yield given equation 
(10), while the revision of beliefs causes the coefficient on vt_l and 
the variance of the error term to be time variant as in equation (30). 
In the following section we consider such an application of 
inconsistent learning. The justification for inconsistency is found by 
placing limitations on the sophistocation of agents or in restricting 
the initial information endowments in their possession. Both of these 
possibilities find a rationalisation in the existence of learning costs, 
which place bounds on the abilities of agents. 
This particular application of inconsistent learning, which is by 
no means exhaustive, even within the set of inconsistent learning 
strategies, may be regarded as a particular case or as a first 
approximation. We also consider a learning strategy which makes use of 
the social interaction between agents as an alternativp. possihility. 
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4.6 Applications of Learning 
Two Fundamental questions are what and how will agents endeavour 
to learn in the context of this model? The first question is the more 
easily answered because risk-neutral agents will be concerned only with 
the first moments of the asset yield distributions; and this concern 
w~ll be limited to the relative mean yield between dcd and fcd assets in 
this two-asset model. 
The relative mean yield under the revision of beliefs will be 
given by equation (30). Agents will need to learn this form in order to 
make expectations of its mathematical mean. It is determined in part by 
the exogenous process of the interest rate differential and in part by 
the evolution of market beliefs, which determine the exchange rate and, 
so, the rate of depreciation. 
The second question of how agents will learn is one of great 
interest and is not easily resolved. In the last section, consistent 
and inconsistent learning were considered as two generalities. One 
approach is to focus on the 'rationality' of agents, meaning that they 
would not persist with sub-optimal learning strategies which cause 
inaccurate and biased forecasting. However, inconsistent learning may 
be the only plausible possibility, if agents have not the basic ability 
or the initial information to solve the effects of other agents' 
learning on the model, particularly where the context is of a 
decentralised market. 
Much of the prohlp.m is due to the fact th.qt le8rn;ng 1 s "";:l.l~lly 
treated as a statistical inference problem, where agents obserle ~ 
single signal in the form of a market outcome, typically price, and must 
then simultaneously solve the fundamentals of the model and the 
(changing) beliefs of other agents. It is necessary to the success of 
this operation that agents know the likelihood functions of other 
agents. 
An alternative possibility is that there are two sources from 
which agents can learn, so that there is limited reliance on the price-
signal extraction problem. We consider a case of learning where agents 
learn separately the process determining the interest rate differential 
and market beliefs. The coefficient in the Markov process for the 
interest rate differential in equation (4) can be learned consistently 
by econometric estimation. Market beliefs can be learned by a social 
sampling process. 
This is the first strategy to be considered. The second strategy 
will be an inconsistent learning example akin to the one given by Cyeri 
and DeGroot (1974) and by Bray and Savin (1986), where agents are 
learning the form of the model which is only correct inside REE. These 
two possibilities are, of course, by no means exhaustive. They each 
have the merit of technical simplicity, if they lack the degree of 
sophistocation which one would impute to economic agents. They may be 
regarded, like economic models, as first approximations to more 
complicated processes. 
4.6.1 Strategy One 
The first strategy takes into account the social inte=action 
between agents within the market as a mechanism for comrn\l~ic~ting 
beliefs. Learning theory, as mentioned above, is usuaJly treated as an 
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application of statistical decision theory where agents are believed to 
respond to a price-signal extraction problem. Notwithstanding the 
economic interest in learning from prices, there is also some gain in 
considering more social forms of learning. 
The latter is a rationale for the operation of organised market 
institutions, which have a role beyond the mere communication of prices. 
This is clear for the stock exchange, the commodity and the foreign 
currency exchanges, especially in the days before 'big bang'. Even 
after big bang, there is still scope for agents to communicate their 
beliefs, even though the computer terminal has to a great extent 
superceded the stock exchange floor. Agents will still have some 
incentive to seek information by picking up the telephone or by meeting 
over lunch or in the golf club, where market beliefs are relevant to 
price determination. 
The dichotomy which we are making between price-learning and 
social-learning processes is useful in application to this model where 
the relevant variable of concern, the relative mean yield between the 
two assets, is determined by objective and subjective factors. It is 
proposed that the two learning processes can be related to the two 
respective factors. 
We assume that the social learning may be regarded a3 a random 
sampling process from a large number of agents in order to rule out 
monopolistic behaviour. Each agent is small in relation to the whole 
market and there are no collusive groupings. Price - taking beha'.riour is 
assumed. 
In each time period each agent randomly meets a small number of 
other agents separately. Each agent trades information separately with 
. 
those agents sampled: agent i meets s agents, indexed j= .. s-l, s; and 
i communicates his belief to j in exchange for j communicating his 
belief tv i. The sample of s agents may be regarded as a random drawing 
of market opinion, which each is endeavouring to learn. 
It is assumed that there is no strategic behaviour in the sense of 
agents giving misinformation, so each communicates what he actually 
believes at the time. There is no incentive to mislead because of the 
atomistic nature of agents. However, as there is also no incentive to 
give information which is believed by the agent to be correct, we will 
also assume that agents are fundamentally honest. 
The constraint on this form of learning is che sample size, s, 
which is small in relation to the total size of the market, N. If the 
sample size could tend towards the size of the marke~, the tendency 
would be for the agent to learn market opinion exactly. Sample size is 
limited by time and by access, and agents can only buy access by 
surrendering leisue and other forms of economic activity. We assume 
that all agents in the market have an equality of access, so that the 
sample size, s, is the same for all agents. 
The exchange rate is partly determined by market beliefs, whe~€ 
the coefficient on the lagged interest rate differential is b Gmt_l q. 
Two assumptions will be made concerning individual beliefs in order tc 
formulate a learning strategy based on the social interaction between 
the agent.c; > These relate to what each individual 
as a whole and of other agents as indi'liduals. we al30 assume that ~ht 
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value of the parameter, a, in the Markov process for the interest rate 
differential is common knowledge. 
Assumption 1: each agent i believes that 
bq r for all t 
Each agent believes that the coefficient on the interest rate 
differential in equation (27) is a constant, because each believes that 
market beliefs are constant over time. 
Assumption 2: each agent i believes that 
r + ujt 
NIID (0, a) for all j 
Each agent believes that each individual agent's belief on (constant) 
market beliefs is correct in expected value but is subject to a white-
noise error. The variance of the white-noise error is believed to be 
the same for all j agents. The white-noise errors of the j agents are 
believed to be uncorrelated. 
The first assumption implies that agents will endeavour to learn 
market beliefs as a constant parameter. The second assumption indicates 
that each agent might endeavour to learn market beliefs by sampling the 
opinions of other agents as to its value. 
It is assumed without less of generality that each agent samples 
the opinions of s agents. The sample of market opinion of agent i at 
time t can be represented by 
., S 
.1. ' ..... ., , 
gi t (j t) ~ Gjt r 
\ ~, ~ 
- -, 
s i >-;0' i. 
- I.. 
It is determined by the random drawing of s agents, who are indexed j. 
The belief of each of the s agents is equally weighted by the factor, 
lis. 
Agent i' s belief on the distribution of the sample can hp. obt Ai llP0 
from Assumption 2 and equation (31): each agent, i, believes that 
NIID (r, a/s) 1 ~ s < N 
The expected value of the sample is believed to be the constant value 
for market beliefs. The variance is believed to be related positively 
to the believed variance of agent j's belief and inversely to the size 
of the sample. There are therefore perceived benefits in increasing 
sample size as well as costs. 
A learning strategy is now proposed. Each agent, i, forms a 
belief on the the perceived constant of market opinion by revising a 
previously held belief in the light of new information received from the 
sample. Agent i's belief at Lime t can be represented as a weighted 
average of his belief at time t-l plus the sampled beliefs of the 
agents, j, at time t. Generally, the weights, Ai t , I - Ai t , will be 
time-variant, so that 
(32) 
If the agent were a Bayesian practising optimal decision theory, 
the weights at any time would be determined by the subjective precision 
0[ hi.s anterior belief relative to the (subjective) precisi:Jr. of the 
sampled beliefs. So if the sample size, 5, is great relative to the 
. d . f agent's be11' ef of market beliefs around ac 1::'.13.1 perce1ve var1ance 0 an 
market beliefs, then the weight, Ai t , would be smull, because Lhe 
I h • 1 A "':~l": ~ ~1'''~ ~n~o"''''--~-- Th:: sumpl ing process wou d LIe oe_ ieve'J to 1 ........ '-> p ... e·_ ~.~ .... .... .:.. a:c., ..... ". 
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weights will also depend on the purely subjective prior precision of the 
agent belief at a starting point of the learning process. 
Having determined individual beliefs on the value of r, market 
beliefs on the value of r (but not the value of r itself) can be 
determined by aggregation. A market-power weighted average of 
individual beliefs given by equation (32) is 
(33) 
A third (set of) assumption(s) is now made to restrict the form of 
equation (33). Two alternatives will suffice: we assume that either wi 
and Ait are orthogonal to individual beliefs, Gi t _l rand Gjt-l rand 
that N is very large, or that the value of wi and Ait are the same for 
all agents. This second possibility gives respective values for the t\vO 
weighting factors of lis and At. We call this third set the 'weighting 
assumptions' ~ 
The weighting assumptions and the random nature of the sampling 
process will ensure that market beliefs on the value of r are restricted 
to 
Gm r for all t (34) 
Market beliefs on the value of r are constant, although individual 
beliefs on the value of r are generally under revision. This conditiofi 
required the three assumptions that individuals believe market beliefs 
to be constant, that they believe other agents (who also believe the 
same) know market beliefs, but subject to a white noise, ~nd the 
weightings are either orthogonal or the same across the market. 
first two conditions ensure that market beliefs are stationary, the 
addition of the third ensures thac they are noiseless as well as 
stationary, and so constant. 
The learning in this example is of market opinion. The individual 
does not learn the REE of the model in the usual sense, where each order 
of beliefs on the value of parameters coincides with their actual 
values. Individual beliefs may converge to market beliefs, but market 
beliefs will generally be outside their REE configuration. 
Equation (32) shows that individual beliefs should converge over 
time to their market average, as the sampling process causes differences 
between individual beliefs to be removed. There are two factors which 
strengthen this process. One is the passage of time. Since the agent 
can expect to meet a different selection of s agents in each time 
period, he meets a larger section of the market as time progresses. The 
other is the indirect communication of beliefs between agents. If agent 
i's belief is influenced by agent j's and agent j's is influenced by 
agent k's, and so on, then agent i's belief is influenced indirectly by 
a whole chain of beliefs. 
Consistent expectations [with equation (27)] and Assumption 1 
together give individual expectations of the exchange rate as 
,...,r) 
\ .J) 
At time t-l when the expectation is made, only the then contemporaneous 
observations for the cur=ent account and the into=est rate differ€n~ial 
are received. It is kno,Yn that the two follow a random walk and a 
Markov process, respectively. 
Tt has al~o been asslli~ed that the valUe 
~_ ... ,...,~_ 1r __ •• ' _ ...l __ 
\... Vt:.UIlV.L! :' ... 1,:\..,' ~ •. ..L -::;·...L6-= 
Individual expectations for the exchange rate at time t+l and for the 
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interest rate differential at t are accordingly derived from equations 
(4) and (35) as 
- f t - l + 0 Gi t _l r v t - l (36) 
o vt-l (37) 
Combining equations (35) - (37) give individual expectations of the mean 
relative yield as 
[0 + Gi t _l r (1 - 0)] vt-l (38) 
Aggregation to obtain the corresponding market expectation of the mean 
relative yield, applying equation (34), gives 
[0 + Gm r (1 - 0)] vt-l (39) 
Market beliefs on r are a constant, unlike individual beliefs on r. 
Substitution of equation (39) into equation (1) gives the exchange rate 
as 
- f t - b[O + Gm r (1 - 0)] vt_l (40) 
The coefficient on the interest rate differential is constant 
because market beliefs on the value of r is constant, which is dGrived 
from the three assumptions considered above, and because the value of 0 
is common knowledge, which implies that beliefs on its value are not 
subject to revision. Consequently, Assumption 1 is justified. The 
effect of the learning on the model is consistent with agents prior 
beliefs. This strategy is consistent in the sense that learning has no 
unanticipated effect on the model. 
The model is always in an equilibrium defined by the constant 
parameter on the interest rate differential, provided that the value of 
b is b~unded. giving imperfect capital mobility: 
r b [8 - Gm r (1 - B) 1 , , 
This equilibrium is not a conventional macroeconomic REE, save ~r. the 
special case where 
r Gm r b8/[l + b(l - 8)] 
In this case, b can be unbounded, provided that the value of 8 is not 
unity. 
Furthermore, this equilibrium is generally dogged by the problem 
of multiplicity. There is no solution to market beliefs, which can take 
the value of any constant. The REE case just cited is only one 
possibility. Market beliefs of any level are self-fulfilling, which 
makes for the problem of multiplicity. 
However, it should be said that this is basically different from 
the multiplicity problem considered in Chapter 3 which besets dynamic 
rational expectations models. There the issue is of the indeterminacy 
of the constant of integration for a model which is presented in the 
form of a difference equation. Here the issue ~s that constant market 
beliefs are like any constant parameter of the model. In the sense that 
any equilibrium solution depends on the imposed value for b or for 8, 
the level of market beliefs can be regarded as an imposed parameter and 
not as something which is endogenous to the model. 
As the model is generally outside REE, save where r and market 
beliefs on r coincide, it is feasible to categorise the difference 
between its equilibrium and the corresponding REE as a bubble. The 
bubble will be one which declines geometrically and asympto,icaily t~ 
zero, provided that () is within the unit circle - unlike the 
characteristic REE bubhlp. which I~an 1).:- dynamically 1.mst:-,bl~ 
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4.6.2 Strategy Two 
As an alternative strategy we consider one of the type considered 
by Cyert and DeGroot (1974) and by Bray and Savin (1986). Learning is 
inconsistent because agents specify a constant parameter form for the 
model, but the effect of learning, in the revision of beliefs, is to 
cause those parameters to vary. In this example unlike the previous 
one, there is no social learning, so that agents may be regarded as 
outsiders who do not have access to the opinions of those in the market. 
An analysis of inconsistent learning is of interest because we can 
reflect a result of Bray and Savin (1986), that the stability of 
learning depends on a parameterisation favourable to the determinacy of 
the underlying model. However, to make the analysis more tractable for 
a model which contains two expectations of the endogenous variables, we 
apply a simpler error correction mechanism for beliefs on the relevanc 
parameter. 
Agents are again interested in learning the mean relative yield in 
a form given by equation (26) where it is believed that the coefficient 
on the interest rate differential is constant. Inconsistency results 
because the actual form for relative yield under learning is given by 
equation (30). 
Agents form adaptive expectations of this parameter, where there 
is a constant rate of adaption, 1 - A. This represents the pace of 
learning, and affects the stability of the process. 
revised according to 
Market beliefs are 
15~ 
Gmt q A Gmt _1 q + (1 - A) Zt/Vt_2 where V t - 2 "'"' 0 } Gmt q Gmt _1 q where V t - 2 0 
Substituting in equation (30) for the relative yield gives 
A Gm t _1 q + 
[ 
Vt 1 + b(Gmt _1 q v t -1 - Gmt _2 q v t -1) + € 1 (1 - A) ------------=--=---=---t
J1 v t -2 
where vt _1 ;&! 0 
(41) 
(42) 
For further simplification, we assume that beliefs are revised only 
at every other data point, so that 
Gmt _1 q Gmt _2 q, Gmt _3 q Gmt _4 q, ..... 
We may write 
Gmt q ett + f3 t Gmt _2 q (43) 
where, using equation (4), 
[ 8 + [ Q) wt -2-i J -1 1 (1 - A) (wt -1 + €t) L i=O J 
(44) 
r [ wt -2-i ) - -, ] l Q) .... p. + (1 - A) b (B - 1) + wt -1 L i=O 
The necessary and sufficient condition for expected stability (see 
Appendix 4.A.2 for its derivation) is that 
I A + (1 - A) b(B - 1) I < 1 
We can consider a number of possibilities. First, if the value of b is 
unbounded, representing perfect capital mobility and giviug inter2st 
ra~e parity inside REE, it is necessary (but not sufficient) to 
stability, that the value of 8 is unity. However, the combina~ion nf an 
unbounded value for b with a unit value for e is inconsistent with th:: 
existence of a REE [See equation (9)] _ The c0!1c11~si(_'!~ l~ l!!c.t if .. h .... 
operational use of REE is to be justified only by the criter~an or i:s 
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stability properties, as guaged by a process of (inconsistent) learning. 
then a REE equilibrium with interest rate parity for the exchange cannot 
be used. 
Stability is the more likely, the lower the value of b, 
representing the degree of capital mobility. Capital mobility in this 
model represents the magnitude of wealth holdings and borrowings which 
are sper-t on (risk-neutral) speculation as well as to the 8peed of 
portfolio-adjustment. Therefore, there is some scope for a Tobin (1978) 
tax to stabilise the model by reducing commitments to speculate based on 
inconsistent learning. 
The possibility of stability will be inversely related to the pace 
of learning, which is represented by the parameter, 1 - A. If A is 
close to unity, the chance of stability is greater. However the 
significance of this parameter is weak, if there is very high capital 
mobility, as ·we would expect. 
Leaving aside the limiting case of perfect capital mobility, the 
stability of learning requires that the value B is close to unity or 
that the interest rate differential approximates a random walk. The 
exchange rate in the resulting REE will then approximate a random walk, 
which seems to be regarded as a stylized fact. The value of 8 will 
generally approximate unity where short-run changes in the interesL rate 
differential are being considered, as the rate of geometric decline in a 
variable over a very short period of time will be approximately zero. 
the more stable, if the model is based on relat~vel~l shor::-run 
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speculation. This is because the inconsistent learning process causes 
agents to over-react to the signal observed. In the short-run, there is 
less movement in the interest rate differential, which is a part of the 
signal, and so less over-reaction. This improves the chances of 
stability. 
The stability condition is related to the condition for the 
existence of equilibrium outside REE in equation (29). The condition 
there was one relating to beliefs, whereas the condition here relates to 
actual parameter values. The similarity may be regarded as a beliefs-
augmented variant of Samuelson's (1948) principle of the correspondence 
between the statics and dynamics of a model. It also suggests a result 
obtained by Bray and Savin (1986), that the parameterisation favourable 
to stability in the static expectations case of the cobweb model is also 
favourable to the stability of its rational expectations form. 
Finally, both learning strategies required the parameter b to be 
bounded for stability. In terms of our analysis in Chapte~ 2, there 
will then be direct current account effects on the exchange rate - even 
within full rational expectations. 
4.7 Some Further Considerations 
4.7.1 The Individual Optimality of Inconsistent Learning 
Agent:s may be better off with a process of inconsistent learning 
1 . r 11 _Following a structural if the only alternative is no earn1ng a_ a -' 
'11 11 make b,·_aso.d ~orecasts and ~ith h~~_h~r m~~n change agents Wl genera y r. ~ 
square error than before the change. Learning, however inconsistent, 
, -
.c.) ... 
will reduce the bias and mean square error, if it is convergent and 
brings them closer to the new REE. Consistent learning may not be 
possible, while inconsistent learning may be convergent and bring the 
benefit of increased accuracy in forecasting. The benefits will be the 
greater, the faster the rate of convergence. 
There will always be an incentive for the individual agent to 
learn because of the decentralised nature of the market. Ex ante the 
isolated individual makes a decision to learn which is uncoordinated 
with any decisions of other agents. As he is small in relation to the 
market, he cannot expect his decision to affect the model being learned. 
So ex ante each agent may expect his learning to be consistent with the 
model. 
It is when a large number of isolated agents initiateiearning 
that the joint effect of their uncoordinated actions causes 
inconsistency. Learning then has unanticipated effects on the model 
being learned. For unfavourable parameterizations their learning may 
become unstable as well as inconsistent. If learning is unstable then 
each agent may be better off in terms of greater forecasting accuracy it 
none is learning at all. 
This raises the issue of an externality in inconsistent and 
unstable learning. Ex ante each agent percei~les the benefits in 
improved forecas ting, but: once many agents operate learning ,·.rhich prove:--
to be inconsistent and unstable, there may be a greater agitation in the 
data, leading to worse forecasts all round. 
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This externality is different to the kind of externality perceived 
by Grossman (1976) and by Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) in the context of 
a REE outside strong-form informational efficiency. There no one will 
pay the cost of collecting private information because there is the 
belief that others will do so, so that individuals wait for market price 
to convey the information which is costly to collect. Consequently, no 
one collects information, or very few, so that price cannot aggregate 
the information which would be collected. Paraphrasing, the Grossman 
and Stiglitz externality arises because no one is prepared to learn 
close to strong-form informational efficiency with non-zero learning 
costs. Here, the externality arises because there is a lack of 
coordination, and many agents are prepared to learn and are ignorant of 
the unfavourable parameterization which lead to instability. 
We can relax the rational expectations assumption that agents, to 
quote Arrow (1978), are 'superior statisticians' adept at the 
exploitation of all available information. The ability to process 
information could be regarded as a limited endowment or as an aspect of 
human capital which is acquired at a cost. It is then possible to bring 
inconsistent learning within a framework of individual optimality by 
involving the equation of expected marginal costs with benefits. An 
optimum may be reached long before consistent learning where the 
expected gains from increased sophistication to learning do not exceed 
h d Th;s draws us to a modified hypothesis of rational t .. e expec te cos ts . ... 
cxpectacions,3 which relates to search theory. 
3 Snippe (1986) designates this a weak-form of the rational 
expectations hypothesis. 
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4.7.2 The Determinacy of the Inconsistent Forecast FQ~ction 
Frydman (1982 and 1983) has concluded that consistent learning is 
not generally possible in a decentralised market and that inconsistent 
learning, and therefore the inconsistent forecast function, is 
indeterminate. Inconsistent learning is indeterminate because if agents 
are using inconsistent forecast functions from learning an inconsistent 
model of the economy, there is always an incentive for agents to employ 
an improved forecast function. 
In terms of the model, if agents are generally forecasting 
according to equation (10), there is an incentive for individual agel1t:s 
to forecast consistently, by taking this into account. But once a 
sufficient number of individuals revise their learning and forecast 
functions accordingly, the revised form too becomes inconsistent, and 
there is then an incentive to revise further the learning process and 
forecast function. As soon as this is adopted by many agents, there is 
a new incentive to revise the learning process and forecasL function. 
A process is envisaged where forecast functions are continuously 
being revised and, accordingly, the model too. The revision in the 
forecast functions always lags behind the change in the model. In the 
limit the forecast function should converge to the model, and learning 
becomes consistent, but the limit will not be reached because of the 
imposs ibili ty of consis tent forecasting in a decentralised mc3.rke t. 
He"Never, an implicit assumption in this is thc>t there is no 
disincentive to revising a forecast function. In the last subsection l~~ 
was argued that learning costs act as such a r1isinc~nti"t? Ther~f0!_~. e 
consideration of non-zero learning costs will place a limit on the 
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process of revision. Learning becomes fully determinate because there 
is an 'equilibrium' where the expected benefi~s to revising a learning 
equation and forecast function do not exceed the costs. Non-zero 
learning costs overcome the Frydman 'stalemate' in learning where 
consistent learning is impossible and inconsistent learning is 
indeterminate. 
4.7.3 Wealth Dynamics 
Agents' beliefs reflect what they have learned from the model and 
these are incorporated in their forecast functions. The assumption of a 
uniformity in learning and forecasting across agents must be rejected, 
if we reject the notion of the uniformity of beliefs. 
Risk-neutral agents will be strongly committed to one-way bets 
based on their forecasts of relative mean asset yields. Therefore with 
heterogeneous beliefs, some will be making strong gains and others 
s~rong losses. Wealth should be transferred from agents with i~ferior 
learning processes and forecast functions to those with superior ones. 
Cootner (1967) and Feiger (1978) considered wealth dynamics, as such, as 
a mechanism towards an efficient market. The less informed would be 
weeded out and the good forecasters would flourish The mechanism 
should hasten the evolution of increased sophistication in learning and 
in forecasting. 
Furthermore, the size of the market will become smaller if 
inferior forecasters ar2 eliminated at a faster rate than the rate of 
1 h d · l-;n hn~ ~ha lirn~~ ot influx of new entrants. So we::. tl ynam~cs can exp c..;.. 1 c.'"' ,.. " •• - - lLL .... 
.. . 11 h h d.. h ~/ ~ h ~ ~! i f!1 i ,., .-=! ~ ~ !~ ,-. eons is tent learnine mi eht: hypotn~t:lc."I y. e rE'~C P., • 
of agents until the market loses its decentralised character. 
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behaviour could cease to become competitive but collusive with 
information pooling. 
However, although the hypothesis of wealth transfers enriches the 
learning analysis, we would expect certain markets to remain 
decentralised. Consequently we emphasise information or learning costs 
to explain why the limit will not be reached. 
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APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 4 
4.A.l The REE Solution 
It is assumed that agents know the structural form of the 
equations for the exchange rate (11), for the interest rate differential 
(9) and for relative asset supplies, (7). Agents can then d~rectly 
estimate the coefficients in the equations for the last two. A rational 
expectations reduced-form may be written in terms of observables at tal 
and an error, k t 
(A. J ) 
with a white noise unobservable disturbance, k t with zero mean. 
Consistent expectations from equations (2), (4) and (A.l), for c t and 
ct+l 
and 
And 
give 
Gmt_l c t 
Gmt_l ct+l 
from equation 
Gmt_l v t 
from equation 
-f 1 t-
-f 1 + t- II vt-l + Co 
s-t 
-f 1 t- + II 8 vt-l + Co 
5 - (t+l) 
(4) 
fJ vt-l 
(5) : 
Substitution of equations (A.2) to (A.4) into (8) and then into (6) 
gives the solution 
II -bfJ/ll + b(1-8)] 
<5 b/[l+b] 
k t -€t 
where Co is indeterminate. 
(A.2) 
(A. 3) 
160 
Co can take on any value, so that there is an infinity of REE [see 
Shiller (1978)]. There is only one stable solution, where Co is zero, 
otherwise the REE path explodes as b/[l+b] is less than one. We 
consider only the unique stationary solution by involking the existence 
of a terminal condition to determine the long-run equilibrium of the 
exchange rate. This leaves 
at - bB/[1+b(1-8)j vt-l (A.S) 
i6i 
4.A.2 The Convergence Condition for Strategy Two 
The white noise properties of €t and wt in equations (2) and (4) 
imply that the coefficients in equation (44) have the properties 
and 
(1 - A) 8 
A + (1 - A) b (8 - 1) 
for all t 
for all t 
[A + (1 - A) b (8 - 1)]2 for all t 
From equation (43) 
E [Gmt +2 q] 
E [Gm t +4 q] E [Qt+4 + Pt+4 Qt+2 + Pt +4 Pt +2 at] 
+ E [P t +4 fit+2 fit] Gmt q 
It is clear that beliefs will converge in expected value if 
[A + (1 - A) b(8 - 1)]2 < 1 
(A. 6) 
(A.7) 
(A.8) 
If this condition is met, from equations (A.6) and (A,7), beliefs wilJ 
167. 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
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In the preceding chapters, a range of issues relevant to exchange 
rate economics have been considered. The focus throughout was on the 
role of information in conditioning expectations. The starting point of 
the analysis was the assumption that although individuals may be 
rational economic agents, they may not fully know the parameter values 
of a model, which represents the uncertain world they face. 
Expectations errors will then be systematic, and under a process of 
revision, where agents are endeavouring to learn more about the world. 
In Chapter 2 an asset market model was considered and yet one 
where the exchange rate was determined by the total balance of payments. 
The standard result that (observed) current account shocks could not 
affect the exchange rate was obtained with full rational expectations. 
It was then shown that this result could be overturned, if this 
particular restriction was relaxed, even if the assumption of perfect 
capital mobility was maintained. The sign of the effect depended on 
whether current account shocks were over- or under-anticipated. The 
effect worked through misinformation conditioning the expectations which 
determined the capital account side of the balance of payments. 
A parallel analysis could be made of foreign exchange 
intervention, as these flows may also enter the total balance of 
payments under imperfect floating. Intervention would directly affect 
the exchange rate, if agents incorrectly believed that the govenment was 
not following an interventionist policy. This applies even with perfect 
capital mobility (and risk-neutral speculation). Governments may 
therefore have an incentive to publicise a 'hands-off' policy, while 
actually engaging in intenTp.ntion. 
16.:. 
Another issue in this chapter was the learning of the long-run 
equilibrium exchange rate. Agents were able to learn the unique 
solution which brought about long-run current account balance, because 
of the total balance of payments specification of the model. The 
sluggishness with which agents might revise their beliefs relative to 
the speed of underlying changes in the model gave rise to the 
possibility of over-shooting in the short-run before the long-run would 
be reached. 
In Chapter 3 the issue of uniqueness was used to discount the 
rational bubble hypothesis. The purpose of this chapter was to show 
that non-stationarities in the data could be attributed to optimising 
agents trying to acquire full rational expectations. This hypothesis 
was advanced against the assumption that agents were confined to a world 
with expectations which were either unstable but rational, or in 
disequilibrium. 
Bayesian learning was considered, giving scope for subjective 
priors to affect the data. If agents had relative confidence in their 
initial beliefs, then policy changes, which could only work through 
altering beliefs, would have little effect on the model. This implies 
that the effects of a change to a policy which would be unsustainable in 
the long-run (perfect persistence in the interest rate differential), 
would be mitigated in the short-run, if agents had little prior 
confidence in its sustainability. Patterns of the dCtta were related Lo 
the Bayesian precisions of agents' beliefs. 
The form of the learning in this t:hc.pter w.a':' 51Jr~h that ':ige!l!.:s 
effectively acted as one. Consequently, there was no question of agents 
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learning about the beliefs of each other. A 1 n essentia 1y macroeconomic 
paradigm was being considered. Furthe~ore, there were no repercussions 
from the learning process on to the part f h 1 o t e mode being learned. 
The simplified structure of information, which was implicit, could admit 
consistency in learning. 
In Chapter 4 some attempt was made to look at the problem of 
agents trying to learn the beliefs of others in a decentralised market. 
If the problem of the Keynesian regress in expectations is considered, 
the analysis becomes more difficult. As a perspective for the 
discussion, reference was made to a number of issues which have arisen 
in the non-macroeconomic literature on efficient markets. 
The sheer weight of the problem gravitates against the ready 
acceptance of consistent learning forms, which themselves require overlY 
strong assumptions on the initial availability of information. We refer 
to the learning literature surveyed by Blume, Bray and Easley (1982) and 
to Frydman and Phelps (1983). The requirement - that agents know the 
likelihood functions of other agents in order to be able to anticipate 
the effects of their learning on the model - cannot plausibly be 
reconciled with the decentralised world under consideration. 
Two weak-form learning stategies were also considered in Chapter 
4. One was consistent in the sense that there was no unanticipated 
~ffect from the learning process to the model being learned, although 
agents were generally outside full rational expectations. The merit of 
this example was that it described a process, which many would typify as 
a plausible form of hubhle. It was constituted by ;:lgents individ1..lally 
trying to learn the beliefs of the market. The deviation [rom full 
rational expectations declined over time. 
The second strategy was the popular example where agents were 
trying to learn a specification of the model, which is only correct 
inside rational expectations. This is also to be found in the models of 
Cyert and DeGroot (1974) and of Bray and Savin (1986). Similarly, we 
concluded that the parameter conditions favourable. to the stability of 
the process to rational expectations were related to those for the 
determinacy of the model outside rational expectations. The lack of 
perfect capital mobility was found to be a necessary condition to the 
stability of learning. 
The implication of this result is that the combination of perfect 
capital mobility with full rational expectations (which ensures by 
construction an equilibrium for this extreme case) may not be 
reconcilable. Tnis is because the learning forms, generally 
inconsistent, are not stable with perfect capital mobility. This, 
therefore, questions the operational use of rational expectations by the 
criterion of learning for a model with this parameterisation. Returning 
to the analysis of Chapter 2, the implication of imperfect capital 
mobility is of direct current account effects on the exchange rate even 
with full rational expectations. 
Various theoretical issues have been considered in this thE:~is. 
The conclusions which have emerged also have implications for the 
empirical modelling of exchange rates. Basically, we reco~~end th~ 
relaxation of certain ~ ~rinri r~strictions. whi~h 
models with stronger assumptions on the availability 0-: information. 
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There may be correlations between the exchange rate variables (current 
account and intervention flows) which are precluded by the asset market 
view. The strengths and evp.n the signs of these correlations will 
depend on the information which is available at the time. Furthermore, 
patterns of time-variance in the coefficents of the model may captu~e 
the revision of beliefs within an environment of limited information 
l68 
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